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Abstract 
The focus of this thesis is the emerging area of the European energy policy on gas. Traditionally, 
European energy policy has been approached from a state-centric perspective inducing little 
attention to the effects of the emerging institutional and regulatory development within the EU. 
Thus, the thesis investigates how the emerging field of European energy policy in the EU induces 
both intergovernmental cooperation and supranational institutionalisation 
 
with a specific view to 
the emerging regulatory governance.  
Specifically, the thesis addresses how the European energy policy is developing and to what extent 
the EU recognition of Nord Stream can be understood in the context of this emerging policy area? 
Addressing the research area, we employ a theoretical framework of neoliberal institutionalism and 
regulatory governance. Together with a qualitative empirical approach based primarily on 
interviews, we investigate the duality of and interplay between intergovernmental practices and 
institutional regulatory cooperation, which is found to be increasingly important in framing the EU 
energy policy. We thus proceed beyond the mere intergovernmental level to an investigation of the 
emergence and role of new regulatory actors at a horizontal level, ipso facto in between the 
intergovernmental and supranational level. Finally, we investigate the case of the pipeline project 
Nord Stream and the process leading to its recognition as a project of European interest . Here, we 
focus on the debate around its construction, the process leading to its EU recognition and finally 
how Nord Stream can be seen as testing ground for the EU energy policy.  
We conclude that the European energy policy is shaped by two - in some aspects coherent and in 
others contradicting - trends of securitisation and liberalisation with an increasing Member State 
vigilance to energy security concerns and an EU energy policy based on a liberalisation trend. 
There has nevertheless been an institutionalisation of energy policy at the EU-level against a 
backdrop of three principles: security of supply, diversification and solidarity. These principles are 
found to be the functional answer to both the securitisation and liberalisation trends. We 
furthermore conclude that the introduction of new subnational regulatory actors increasingly frames 
EU energy policy within a liberalisation trend. Finally, we find that the case of Nord Stream 
exposes the contentiousness of the current unresolved hierarchy of competences between the 
Member States and the EU.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
It is important to keep in mind that as long as there is no common policy for an issue area, 
every state will have to find its own solutions Whist (2009:196)  
Little doubt remains that this propagation reveals a traditional understanding of international 
relations - every state is master of its own destiny. This has not least been the case within energy 
policy in Europe. The reality is however that this pessimistic augury is increasingly charged by an 
emerging European Union (EU) energy policy.   
The debate around the development of a European energy policy1 has been fierce throughout the 
new millennium. Today, few observers question that energy has become a matter of highest 
importance for the European states. This is also reflected through its priority at the EU s agenda 
(Baran 2007; Egenhofer 2006; Socor 2006). While energy resources within the EU are depleting, 
the future demand for supply seems unremitting. Many different solutions to deal with this 
particular problem have been suggested. These include demands for a change in energy mix to the 
need for a common EU energy policy with a stronger interconnected and liberalised internal energy 
market. Most solutions proposed however seem to be shrouded in a cloud of state sovereignty, and 
there has been no clear-cut answer from the EU Member States as to which direction a European 
energy policy should take.   
Three EU energy liberalisation packages, attempting to create a common European energy policy 
and an internal market for energy, have been adopted. From the outlook, it therefore seems that 
some consensus has been reached regarding the need for increased European cooperation and 
coordination. On the other hand, attempts to establish a stronger supranational mandate for the EU 
has encountered opposition from a majority of the Member States. The classical problematic of 
competence-transferring to the EU therefore seems reinvigorated within the energy policy. This has 
                                                
1We apply the term European energy policy throughout the thesis, while specifically focusing on gas policy. We 
recognise that European energy policy is often framed as one common policy encompassing all types of energy. 
However, we take into consideration the specific nature of gas, which requires that it must be distinguished from other 
sources of energy. This is especially the case, since the gas market is less integrated/liberalised than e.g. the electricity 
market and, contrary to oil, no world market exists for gas. What furthermore makes gas policy interesting is that gas 
resources are steadily depleting internally in the EU, which prompts reliance on third country suppliers such as Russia 
and Algeria.  
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resulted in an almost two-faced development. Thus, a concurrent development of increased 
cooperation and regulation and retraction to traditional state-centric practices seems to clash within 
the EU energy policy - a policy area, which the President of the European Commission José Manuel 
Barroso (2006) termed the heart of the original idea of European integration . A pivotal question 
is therefore: how can a development towards a more integrated European energy policy - in light of 
these contradictory developments - be explained?  
The European Energy Policy against a Backdrop of Liberalisation and Securitisation 
We see two prominent trends as crucial to understand and frame the current development of the 
European energy policy: liberalisation and securitisation. Despite serious market failures, due to 
the traditional monopoly-structure of the European energy markets, an internal market for energy is 
developing in the EU. This European development seems to reflect a clear liberalisation trend. In 
the pursuit of liberalising the European energy markets the European Commission has been a 
central actor in strengthening, and to some extent also complexifying , the policy development of 
the EU s energy policy. Thus, the introduction of a European level of regulation to ensure the 
completion of the internal energy market appears to be a key feature of the liberalisation trend. In 
this process, Member States have delegated regulatory competences to subnational actors, albeit - at 
least nominally - formal national sovereignty is preserved. These actors have been designated a role 
of strengthening the EU regulation in order to speed up the process of completing and 
interconnecting the internal market for energy. Within the European energy policy, this regulatory 
process and the regulatory actors involved seems to challenge the conventional idea of energy 
policy as being a matter of state sovereignty and high-level meetings. Thus, these regulatory actors 
represent a new level of governance, which together with the increasing role of the Commission, 
challenge the traditional state-centric perspectives on energy policy. Despite the important 
regulatory role of these European actors, little attention from the highest political level has been 
paid to their importance for the emerging European energy policy. A central question in this 
relation is therefore what consequences the apparent Member State lack of vigilance towards the 
functioning of these regulatory actors might have for the wider development of the European 
energy policy?   
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While the above development could seem conducing to the idea that energy policy in the EU is 
solely based on a liberalisation trend, energy remains a securitised commodity. Many Member 
States, and to some extent even the Commission, seem guided by the fact that energy today has 
reached the same high priority-level as more traditional security policy. As Radoman (2007: 36) 
argues, The problems of energy security have long ago ceased to be a subject dealt with only at 
economic forums; they are now deliberated at high-level political meetings between heads of state . 
That energy has been elevated to the agenda of the high-level political meetings suggests that  
Member States, despite a wave of liberalisation, are vigilant to ensure that energy is not just left to 
the market.  
Within the academia, analysing the impact on the European energy policy of the two different 
trends of liberalisation and securitisation in conjunction appears underemphasised. This has fostered 
our interest in analysing how the triumvirate of Member States, the Commission and the new 
regulatory actors conjoin two trends, which appear contradicting, into a European energy policy, 
while respecting both Member States security interests and the wish for full-fledged liberalisation 
of the energy markets.   
While the internal dimension of the European energy policy seems to have been preponderantly 
focused upon the need to liberalise and interconnect the EU energy markets, the debate on an 
external energy policy has often centred around the need to obtain stronger bargaining power vis-à-
vis external suppliers through a coherent stance among the Member States (de Jong and van der 
Linde 2008). That EU gas resources are depleting deems import from non-EU Member States 
necessary. The external dimension of the EU energy policy has however surfaced as a mishmash of 
different strategies, wherein some states much confronted with criticism have sought to instigate 
and utilise friendly relations with external suppliers to ensure their own security of supply. 
Observers commonly point to the lack of solidarity among the EU Member States when bilaterally 
negotiating deals with external suppliers, especially Russia (Belyi 2009; Andersen 2000). This 
tendency of bilateralisation became especially discernible in the aftermath of the energy crisis of 
2006 between Ukraine and Russia, which had severe repercussions for a range of European states 
(de Jong & van der Linde 2008; Kurze 2008; Genç 2009; Whist 2009). Cries for diversification of 
routes and suppliers erupted immediately after this crisis. In reality, there might however be 
divergent perceptions among Member States as to how diversification should be understood and to 
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what extent diversification correlates with national interests.  In relation to this apparent problem, 
the most unremitting case seems to be the Nord Stream gas pipeline.   
Lost in Transmission? The Case of Nord Stream 
The Nord Stream2 gas pipeline from Russia to Germany through the Baltic Sea has been under 
construction since April 2010. Prior to the commencement of the construction, Nord Stream faced 
heavy criticism from Central- and Eastern European Member States with the accusation that the 
pipeline violates the European principles of solidarity and diversification, and would enforce a new 
East-West divide in Europe. Much of the criticism of Nord Stream could seem to be a testimony to 
the discrepancy between, on the one hand, institutional efforts to strengthen the EU energy policy 
area and, on the other hand, the Member States strategies to ensure their national security of 
supply.  
The counter-argument from the Nord Stream consortium was that the new pipeline induces both 
diversification and security of supply - albeit not necessarily for all of Europe - and thereby lives up 
to the key principles of European energy policy. Related to the discussion on solidarity, the former 
German Chancellor and current chairman of Nord Stream s shareholders committee, Gerhard 
Schröder (cf Beckmann 2008: 47) stated, When you have a common energy policy, then it 
shouldn t be the case that when there is a gas contract for western Europe, some members can say 
they are against it. Solidarity is not a one-way street . The criticism seemed primarily targeted at 
the political implications of the project. Nord Stream however outlined that the pipeline is a 
commercial project based on a joint venture between Russian and Western European gas companies 
and not based on an intergovernmental agreement. Framing Nord Stream as a pure business 
venture might be formally correct, but perhaps shows little apprehension of the wider implications 
of energy becoming increasingly securitised. This is a paradox, which we will investigate further.  
Despite the feisty debate on Nord Stream, which seems to go beyond what a pipeline project 
normally would incur, Nord Stream is recognised by the EU as a European project under the Trans-
European Networks for Energy Programme (TEN-E). The pipeline has thus been given a status as a 
                                                
2 Nord Stream is based on a joint venture between Russian and Western European gas companies. The consortium 
behind Nord Stream, Nord Stream AG, is owned by Gazprom, which holds a 51 percent share, while BASF 
SE/Wintershall Holding GmbH (Germany) and E.ON Ruhrgas (Germany) each hold 15,5 percent, and Gasunie (The 
Netherlands) and GDF SUEZ (France) each have a 9 percent share. 
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project that should benefit the EU as a whole - a status, which Nord Stream does not hesitate to 
underline whenever the opportunity arises. At the same time, the critical Member States do not miss 
the opportunity to criticise that Nord Stream has been given this status. The criticism from 
individual EU Member States therefore seems somewhat contradictory to the EU s recognition. A 
central question is therefore what Nord Stream as a case reveals about the current dynamics of the 
European energy policy. 
All in all, Nord Stream constitutes an interesting case in order to analyse the viability of the 
emerging European dimension of energy policy. This thesis therefore aims to understand how the 
EU recognition came about, while testing the strength of the current development of the European 
energy policy.  
1.1 Research question 
We regard the securitisation and liberalisation trends as the two main drivers behind the 
development of the EU energy policy. We therefore find it vital to investigate how a combination of 
the trends shapes the EU energy policy development.  
We seek to accommodate the fact that the European energy policy is a complex matrix with many 
levels of actors and policies. Thus, both a high-level intergovernmental3 perspective and a lower-
level regulatory governance4 perspective will be employed in our analysis to understand the 
development of the EU energy policy. Our preliminary supposition is that an analysis of the high-
level intergovernmental perspective should not be seen in isolation from the concurrent process of 
lower-level regulatory governance, when seeking a coherent picture of the emerging European 
energy policy.  
The introduction outlined the magnitude of the European energy policy and the voluminous amount 
of public and scholarly interest this policy area has attracted. The aim of this dissertation is to 
investigate the development of the European energy policy within a framework of neoliberal 
institutionalism and regulatory governance. There are no explicit references to the theoretical 
framework in the research question, as the focus of the dissertation mainly rests upon an explorative 
                                                
3 By intergovernmental, we here refer both to cooperation between the Member States and cooperation within the 
institutionalised setting of the EU. We thus take into account that institutions matter for the strategies of the Member 
States within energy policy. 
4 The regulatory governance perspective is understood as cooperation involving Member State designated subnational 
authorities engaged in cooperation at the supranational level.  
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empirical approach. In order to avoid a pre-determined theoretical lock-in, the research question 
therefore targets the empirical field of European energy policy. The research question is:  
How is the European energy policy developing and to what extent can the EU recognition of 
Nord Stream be understood in the context of this emerging policy area? 
1.2 Demarcation of the research area 
The thesis focus on the European energy policy development from the early 1990 s to present 
has derivatives from several other studies, which have targeted distinct areas of European energy 
policy. This thesis is however delimitated to a focus solely upon the development of the European 
energy policy for gas. The thesis primarily approaches how the trends of liberalisation and 
securitisation, and their functional response in institutionalised principles and policies, shape the 
European energy policy. By adopting this focus, we furthermore delimitate the scope of research 
from an in-depth focus on the national energy structures. Moreover, the thesis primarily targets the 
politico-economic dimension of the European energy policy for gas, as opposed to a distinct 
economic or technical approach to understand the current development.  
The research question specifically links with the European level of energy policy. Many studies 
focus on intergovernmental energy policies or the EU institutional level of energy policy. This 
thesis however seeks to conjoin these two levels. In lieu of a meticulous investigation of national 
energy policies, this thesis focuses on the complex interplay between the intergovernmental and 
supranational levels.   
We furthermore investigate the EU recognition of Nord Stream as a case for understanding the 
development of the European energy policy. Thus, our focus will be upon the debate on the Nord 
Stream and how the process leading to its EU recognition can be linked to the wider development of 
the EU energy policy. The case of Nord Stream is therefore used as a litmus test for the analysis of 
the development of the European energy policy. 
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1.3 Project Design  
Figure 1 
 10
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Chapter 2: Methodology 
The purpose of this chapter is to present our methodological approach that structures the thesis. 
Firstly, we discuss our approach to the theoretical framework, which includes a clarification of our 
choice and purpose of combining theories from two different theoretical schools.  
Secondly, we outline our use of empirical data in the thesis. We mainly apply qualitative empirical 
material in the form of interviews and policy documents. We furthermore deliberate on the 
framework of actors within the European energy policy and discuss the actor-structure dualism of 
the research area. Finally, we elaborate on the selection of Nord Stream as a case.  
2.1 Approach to the theoretical framework 
This section presents our theoretical approach and the argumentation for the selection of a 
theoretical framework based on neoliberal institutionalism and regulatory governance. We will 
furthermore deliberate on the limitations and critique of the theories.  
European energy policy and the Nord Stream project and their complex relations is not untouched 
ground and have been heavily scrutinised from a variety of perspectives, ranging from International 
Relations theory (e.g. Kirchner & Berk 2010; Belyi 2003) to theories of European integration (e.g. 
Renner 2009) and economic approaches (e.g. Riley 2008). What prompted the theoretical choice of 
neoliberal institutionalism and regulatory governance was that these theories explanatory power in 
conjunction appears underestimated in relation to our research area. Thus, while energy is a matter 
of national sensibility and sovereignty - thus encompassing normal intergovernmental practices - 
the added European dimension, e.g. the instigation of new regulatory networks, increasingly 
prompts new approaches to the traditional state-centric perspectives on energy policy.  
2.1.1 Neoliberal institutionalism 
Energy policy is traditionally understood as a matter of national sovereignty and therefore an area 
where intergovernmental cooperation supposedly should be difficult to obtain. Cooperation between 
states however remains pivotal. Thus, the energy dependence naturally fosters intergovernmental 
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cooperation, as industries and households demand energy supplies, which the government needs to 
ensure. 
But how to provide an understanding of the benefits and pitfalls of intergovernmental cooperation? 
The often-applied theory of neorealism (Waltz 1979) does not place much emphasis on cooperation 
and institutions, and thus lacks explanatory power in order to account for the rationales behind 
cooperation.  
Given that the energy policy in Europe today has reached an unprecedented level of cooperation, 
we find it necessary with a theoretical approach, such as neoliberal institutionalism, which is better 
able to capture intergovernmental cooperation. As Robert O. Keohane, one of the most prominent 
neoliberal institutionalises, argues: (...) my central arguments draw more on the Institutionalist 
tradition, arguing that cooperation can under some conditions develop on the basis of 
complementary interests, and that institutions, broadly defined, affect the patterns of cooperation 
that emerge. (Keohane 1984: 9). Thus, the choice of applying neoliberal institutionalism provides 
us with a theoretical framework for understanding our research area. We consequently apply 
neoliberal institutionalism in order to analyse the intergovernmental cooperation within the EU 
between the Member States. Thereby, we seek an understanding of the logics, mechanisms, 
interests and principles at play, and their influence on the current European energy policy 
development.   
We furthermore seek to understand how a commercial agreement5 such as Nord Stream becomes 
elevated to the institutionalised arena of energy policy within the EU. Neoliberal institutionalism 
allows for a discussion of how serious conflicts, such as the discussions at the EU-level leading to 
the recognition of Nord Stream, either foster or hinder further integration and cooperation within 
energy policy.    
Furthermore, neoliberal institutionalism allows for a high-level analysis and helps analyse what 
the interests and perceptions of the different stakeholders are, and how these interests and 
perceptions are played out in relation to European energy policy cooperation and Nord Stream.   
                                                
5 A further deliberation on the choice of Nord Stream as a case can be found in section 2.4. 
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Limitations to Neoliberal Institutionalism 
Although neoliberal institutionalism does provide a comprehensive and well-suited framework for 
understanding the emergence and institutionalisation of international cooperation, it has also been 
strongly criticised. The predominant critique stems from the neorealist school, even though 
especially Keohane adopts the basic propositions of the neorealist school (Keohane 1984).   
One important point of critique from the neorealist school is that neoliberal institutionalism 
primarily targets low politics , e.g. political economy and human rights, as opposed to high 
politics , such as war and peace (Lamy 2008; Brown 1997; Andreatta 2005; Mearsheimer 1995). A 
central neoliberal institutionalist argument is that interdependence between states creates a changed 
environment characterised by agonism instead of antagonism. However, according to neorealist 
Joseph M. Grieco, this stems from an overly idealistic view of international politics (Grieco 1988). 
Keohane & Martin refute the notion that neoliberal institutionalism lacks explanatory power within 
high politics and emphasise that institutions and cooperation provide crucial information, which 
can alter expectations of states behaviour. This is why institutions can also play a role in 
securitised international environments (Keohane & Martin 1995). This is not least important in the 
case of the European energy policy area, where many observers see a tendency towards energy 
policy becoming high politics. The argument of neoliberal institutionalism is however, high or low 
politics alike, that institutions provide grounds for cooperation, even though Keohane & Martin 
accept that cooperation will be more difficult within high politics. Institutions might become even 
more important when stakes are high (Keohane & Martin 1995: 50).  
Another often-used argument against the neoliberal institutionalist focus on international 
institutions is that the role of institutions is simply overstated (Grieco 1988). Thus, by applying 
neoliberal institutionalism to the field of European energy policy, one risks conducting a fallacious 
syllogism by insisting on the importance of institutions. Methodologically, a counterargument to 
this apparent weakness of the theoretical design is that we seek to go beyond the nominal level of 
institutionalised policy and investigate - predominantly through stakeholder interviews6 - how the 
different actors within the European energy field perceive the importance of the current 
development of institutionalised energy cooperation. 
                                                
6
 A further deliberation on the selection of interviews can be found in section 2.2. 
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2.1.2 Regulatory governance 
While neoliberal institutionalism predominantly focuses on transnational institutionalised 
cooperation, it does not provide a full-fledged picture of the internal dynamics and mechanisms at 
play within international institutions. The theoretical framework of regulatory governance provides 
a better understanding of the role of institutional actors , such as the European Commission. It 
furthermore allows for an analysis of how regulatory governance change the policy process and 
institutional setting. Therefore, according to Levi-Faur (2010: 3), a study of regulatory governance7 
should proceed beyond states, markets and societies into the identification of hybrid forms of 
regulation ( ) autonomous regulatory spaces that blur the distinctions between the global and the 
national . Following this argument, regulatory governance is relevant to apply in our thesis in order 
to discuss how the Commission together with lower-level actors are producers and drivers of 
regulatory governance within the energy policy space beyond the mere state-level. Moreover, 
regulatory governance can provide us with insight into the regulatory aspects of European energy 
policy, which have recently been elevated from a mere national level to a level of horizontal 
delegation, where nationally designated authorities engage in Europe-wide cooperation with the 
task of ensuring transnational regulation.  
Our application of regulatory governance deals with how governance in the making takes place, 
while is does not imply an analysis of outcome (e.g. domestic effects resulting from the regulatory 
governance process). By avoiding a Europeanisation-type analysis of domestic change (e.g. 
Radaelli 2004), regulatory governance allows for an analysis beyond delegation what happens 
in the regulatory governance process? Furthermore, emphasising the regulatory type of governance 
calls for an analysis of the new mechanisms by which regulation becomes part of a European 
agenda. This is different from regarding regulation as solely a national matter. According to Levi-
Faur (2010: 10), regulation is expanding and becoming increasingly complex. Thus, to 
understand how regulation is becoming more and more important in the emerging field of European 
energy policy, we need to take into account the multi-level nature of this development (governance) 
and combine it with a view to the specific characteristics of regulation, such as technical complexity 
and the involvement of experts characteristics which are increasingly apparent within the 
                                                
7 Levi-Faur, in the context of this argument, specifically targets the notion of regulatory capitalism. However, the 
statement fits with the overall trend of regulatory governance, which Levi-Faur (2010) discusses throughout his paper.   
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European governance framework and in many respects manifested in a unique way in the energy 
policy area.   
Furthermore, regulatory governance provides a framework for analysing the creation of 
autonomous regulatory networks. In the context of this thesis, European energy policy can be 
regarded as a policy space in the making , and one in which perhaps not only supranational actors 
(e.g. the European Commission) and Member States are given competences. Thus, subnational 
actors are also assigned competences in European cooperation through horizontal delegation. 
Regulatory governance thus makes room for an analysis in between levels , that is, the spaces 
between the traditional national and supranational levels. This is especially relevant, when 
analysing the policy process internally in the EU and how the securitisation and liberalisation trends 
shape the day-to-day management of the European energy policy8.   
Limitations to Regulatory Governance 
The study of regulatory governance can be characterised as a theoretical framework rather than a 
full-fledged theory. As a consequence, regulatory governance contains a toolbox for understanding 
the emerging field of regulation, which is taking place in a transnational context, while it does not 
aim at testing a set of hypotheses. Accordingly, it is difficult to criticise or falsify9 regulatory 
governance from a theoretical perspective. One could argue that regulatory governance takes its 
point of departure in a number of general tendencies, in order to explain the diffusion of policy-
making, e.g. from government to governance and similarly from national governance towards 
multi-level governance.  
It is relevant to discuss the methodological implications of applying regulatory governance in the 
thesis. We use regulatory governance to analyse an ongoing process, rather than to measure actual 
domestic effects resulting from this process. This fits with a purely practical concern relating to our 
                                                
8 Furthermore, the theoretical framework of regulatory governance gives us tools to analyse the interplay between the 
state and the institutional actors . Thus, the theory allows for an analysis of the nature of delegation that is taking place, 
and how it potentially changes the traditional understanding of energy as a state-centred undertaking.  
9 Karl Popper argues that a hypothesis should be reformulated to an empirical statement, which can be exposed to 
falsification (Popper 1935 in Fuglsang & Bitsch Olsen 2004; Koch 2004). 
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subject matter: Since European regulatory governance within energy policy is a relatively new 
process10, it would be difficult to measure actual policy results stemming from this process.  
We seek to combine neoliberal institutionalism and regulatory governance in order to capture the 
multidimensional development of the European energy policy and the adjacent EU-recognition of 
Nord Stream. Furthermore, confronted with the two preponderant trends of securitisation and 
liberalisation within European energy policy, our theoretical framework gives us tools to analyse 
how the European energy policy process is shaped at different levels by the trends, and how the 
Nord Stream project can be understood in relation to this development. Therefore, we find it 
relevant to apply them in our study, since we wish to cover both a state-centric perspective 
(neoliberal institutionalism) and a perspective beyond delegation into a more institutionalised 
form of European governance (regulatory governance).  
2.2 Empirical Approach 
In this section, we aim at outlining our choice of empirical data and how we methodologically 
approach the data in this thesis. Our data comprises qualitative interviews and documents. Due to 
the comprehensive nature of conducting interviews, the section on interviews will be more 
elaborate than the section on our document analysis. Finally, we elaborate on how our ontological 
field through two different empirical methods creates the possibility of systematic triangulation.  
2.2.1 Interview Design: Semi-structured Stakeholder Interviews 
In order to gain knowledge of the European energy policy with all its complexities, we have 
conducted interviews with a number of stakeholders at different levels of the European energy 
policy.  
We have chosen to conduct semi-structured expert interviews, as approached by Flick (2002: 89), 
where the interviewee is of less interest as a (whole) person than in his or her capacity of being an 
expert for a certain field of activity . As we recognise that European energy policy in many ways is 
a comprehensive and emerging field, the choice of conducting semi-structured interviews is clear. 
Thus, our interest is to gain insight into the knowledge of the interviewees, rather than to focus on 
                                                
10 As an example, the regulatory networks ENTSOG and ERGEG (subsequently ACER) were established in 2009. A 
further elaboration of their role can be found in section 2.3.  
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the interviewees as persons themselves. Furthermore, we characterise our interviewees as 
stakeholders, often as representing certain groups. Thus, they are chosen due to their position within 
the field of European energy policy11. The use of stakeholders as interviewees allows us to gain 
factual knowledge about the research area. We therefore aim at analysing and comparing the 
content of the expert knowledge. Cases are integrated into the study according to the pattern of 
gradual sampling (Flick 2002: 90). More specifically, we seek to continually cross-examine the 
expert knowledge, while recognising that the different interviewees represent various job functions 
and national backgrounds. Thereby, we seek to achieve a better understanding of the interviewees 
knowledge, perception and the interests of the stakeholders they represent.  
More or less all interviewees are presented with the same set of questions within a common 
framework of research. This gives us the opportunity to compare answers of one interviewee with 
answers from other interviewees, while taking into consideration the interviewee s position in 
relation to the overall framework of stakeholders.   
The interviews are semi-structured, in the sense that the concrete issues of interest are defined, 
while the answers are left open (Flick 2002). As an example, we ask all interviewees to pinpoint the 
main drivers behind the EU s energy policy as well as to give their interpretation of key concepts, 
such as security of supply, diversification and solidarity, in order to obtain conceptual clarification 
(Kvale & Brinkmann 2009: 151). This approach enables us to compare the difference in 
understandings, not least in relation to the job function of the interviewee (diplomat, technocrat or 
bureaucrat).   
Objectives and Approach to Interview Data 
The overall objective of the interview study is to obtain data on three levels of European energy 
policy: (1) The interaction between the Member States, (2) The process of regulatory governance at 
the level of horizontal delegation, and (3) The construction and EU recognition of Nord Stream.   
(1) The level of interaction between Member States is coupled with our theoretical approach of 
neoliberal institutionalism. We aim to understand Member State energy policy cooperation within 
the EU against a backdrop of securitisation and liberalisation. Furthermore, the purpose of data 
                                                
11
 For an elaboration of the stakeholders chosen for interview, see Appendix 1: Interview Persons. 
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obtained by the interviews is to analyse the stakeholders view on the development of the European 
energy policy vis-à-vis Member States energy strategies. In line with Kvale & Brinkmann (2009: 
151), we seek to explore the meaning and the conceptual dimensions of central terms, as well as 
their [the interviewees] positions and links within a conceptual network .  
(2) We also aim to analyse the regulatory governance process within European energy policy, 
which has gained notable importance with the recent formalisation of European regulatory 
networks, namely the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas (ENTSOG) 
and Agency for Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER). The purpose with this part of the 
interviews is to analyse the role of the regulatory actors - Transmission System Operators (TSOs) 
and National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) - at the level of horizontal delegation through these 
networks. ENTSOG and ACER are rather new establishments and information about how they 
operate is limited. Furthermore, while being appointed by the Member States, the regulatory actors 
should formally operate independently from the Member States. Therefore, the interviews are 
intended to provide us with insight into the work of these networks and the actors interpretation of 
the networks role in relation to the Member States and the European Commission.   
(3) The construction of Nord Stream and the process leading to the EU recognition is relevant as a 
case to understand the coherence of the European energy policy. The purpose with the interviews in 
relation to this case is therefore two-fold: To gain information about the process and rationale 
behind the EU recognition of Nord Stream and to understand the views of different Member States 
towards this pipeline project.   
Most interviewees were faced with questions within all categories, albeit with some variation with 
respect to the position of the individual interviewee. A total number of 11 interviews12 have been 
conducted. In concordance with the outline above, the selected interviewees can be divided into 
three categories: High-level energy representatives of Member States13; lower-level representatives 
                                                
12
 For an elaboration on the interviewed stakeholders and their role in the European energy policy matrix, see Appendix 
1: Interview Persons. 
13 Interviews conducted with Member State representatives will, often upon a request from the individual interviewee, 
not be perceived as the official view of the Member State, but rather as reflecting the personal perception of the 
interviewee in relation to the topic. 
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engaged in the process of regulatory governance; experts involved in the construction of Nord 
Stream and the EU recognition process of the pipeline.  
We used our network, especially in relation to the lower-level representatives involved in regulatory 
governance, to find the most relevant interview persons. Moreover, we applied the method of 
snowballing by asking interviewees if they could recommend other relevant stakeholders. This gave 
us knowledge of and access to stakeholders, which were otherwise unattainable.  
2.2.2 Approach to the Document Analysis 
Conducting a document analysis necessarily entails some methodological and practical 
considerations. Thus, our use of documents needs to be qualified through a deliberation on the 
different types of documents used in this thesis.  
The aim of our document analysis is to gain knowledge of the research area. Consequently, we 
employ a broad range of different documents. Firstly, relevant legislation and policy documents 
from the EU have been analysed in order to provide the background story for the emergence and 
development of the European energy policy. Secondly, through this document analysis we have 
identified the two main trends: securitisation and liberalisation. This broad pre-analysis has thus 
enabled us to shape our research area and has had an important impact on the questions, which we 
chose to pose during our interviews.  
The EU legislation and policy documents are furthermore analysed in order to understand the 
formally designated role of the Member States, the EU institutions and the regulatory networks. 
Research articles and other sources of information inevitably supplement these policy documents 
and legislation. 
The document analysis furthermore becomes relevant in the case of Nord Stream and its EU 
recognition. The documents surveyed therefore focus on the debate leading up to the recognition of 
the pipeline project and cover academic research, newspapers and EU documents.  
2.2.3 Method triangulation: Interviews and Documents 
Method triangulation is important when seeking to validate results, as well as judging the credibility 
of sources. With the words of Gomm, Triangulation raises the problem of what to do when 
sources disagree (Gomm 2008: 243). More concretely, we aim at a triangulation between the 
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different sources of information gathered through our interviews and document analysis. We 
recognise that there might not be one truth and that different interviewees might hold different 
viewpoints of the development of the European energy policy and the Nord Stream project. By 
triangulating the different sources, we therefore aim at understanding for instance the differences 
between EU legislation and the stakeholders perception of the role of the different actors within the 
EU energy policy.  
Moreover, we employ both EU legislation and interviews with Member State representatives to 
understand the role of regulatory actors. This material is triangulated with the interviews with the 
regulatory actors and their perception of their own regulatory role. Prior to our interviews, we 
furthermore sought to obtain the necessary knowledge in order to be able to cross-examine interests 
and arguments of the interviewee in relation to official documents and the general public debate. 
This kind of validation does not aim at enhancing the story of one truth, but rather to reveal the 
possibility of different understandings of trends and principles within European energy policy and 
the coherence with the Nord Stream project.   
Our approach therefore closely resembles the cross-method triangulation (Gomm 2008: 318). Our 
aim is not to propagate that the truth lies within the majority assertion, as Several sources might 
be erroneous in the same way (Gomm 2008: 319). The goal is therefore not to judge antinomies, 
but instead to understand the ratiocination for these.  
2.3 Field of Actors within the European Energy Policy 
In the following, we deliberate on the field of actors14 within the European energy policy. As the 
figure reveals, energy policy in Europe is characterised by a complex interplay between a range of 
supranational, national and subnational actors engaged in EU-wide cooperation.        
                                                
14
 We delimitate the scope of the analysis from including the gas industry.  
 21
Figure 2: Field of Actors 
 
We recognise that figure 2 is only a perfunctory illustration of the field of actors, but the aim is 
mainly to provide an overall picture of the structures and actors within the European energy policy. 
Our analysis will provide a more thorough examination of the interrelationship between the actors 
as well as how a possible delegation of competences takes place15.   
Figure 2 does not give a clear-cut answer to this thesis approach to the classical discussion of 
agency-structure dualism. We do however need to clarify our approach to the research field in 
relation to the overall discussion of how to perceive the role of agency and structure. Our overall 
aim is to avoid a mono-causal perspective on the dualism-debate.   
The discussion on agency-structure is especially pertinent, as we set out to analyse the complex 
interplay between a number of actors within EU energy policy. Thus, how should we perceive the 
role of the EU? One could argue that the EU possesses characteristics similar to the traditional 
understanding of a structure; hence the EU often develops and enforces rules, which structure the 
                                                
15 Figure 2 does neither seek to take into consideration how the two trends of securitisation and liberalisation are 
shaping the European energy policy, nor how Nord Stream can be understood. We do furthermore not seek to illustrate 
the complex relationship between the various actors within the European energy policy, such as the fact that the TSOs 
and NRAs are designated by the Member States.   
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agency of the actors. On the other hand, the EU also possesses characteristics similar to an actor; 
hence, the EU institutions often act as independent agents. We recognise this dichotomy between 
agency and structure of the EU. Our analytical design therefore takes into account both the role of 
the actors within the EU and the influence of the structural framework, such as the EU legislation.   
Taking the above into consideration, we to some extent adjoin to the theory of structuration by 
Anthony Giddens. Giddens (cf. Bieler & Morton 2001: 8) likewise acknowledges the duality of the 
discussion on agency-structure; thus, The constitution of agents and structures are not two 
independently given sets of phenomena, a dualism, but represents a duality. According to the 
duality of structure, the structural properties of social systems are both medium and outcome of the 
practices they recursively organize. (Giddens cf. Bieler & Morton 2001:8). Although the 
structuration theory has its critics (e.g. Bieler & Morton 2001), we believe that it encapsulates our 
understanding of our ontological and epistemological field. This approach is furthermore backed by 
the theory of neoliberal institutionalism, which also appears to apply a symbiotic approach to the 
agency-structure dualism. This epistemological choice does imply certain practical considerations, 
as our research foremost centres on the agency of the different actors. We perceive their agency as 
constitutive to the structures in determining the development of the European energy policy. These 
structures, e.g. EU legislation and principles, do however also mediate certain patterns of action, 
rendering some acceptable and others unacceptable.  
The above approach is not least sparked by our theoretical framework, in which Keohane (1984: 
26) for instance argues that ( )the behavior of states, as well as of other actors, is strongly 
affected by the constraints and incentives provided by the international environment . Despite the 
fact that actors are influenced by the structures, they are to some extent also able to change the 
structures, notably through institutions (Keohane & Martin 1995).      
Some problems occur as one sets out to understand agency within the field of European energy 
policy. The agency-structure dualism is normally discussed with the objective to define the role of 
agents (states in international relations theory) versus structures. As figure 2 reveals, defining actors 
only as states does not fully embrace the complexity of the European energy policy. Neoliberal 
institutionalism provides some insight into the ontological problems of perceiving states as unitary 
actors, but for the sake of parsimony tends to focus on intergovernmental cooperation, while 
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leaving the more complex analysis of intrastate relations aside (Keohane 1984). Our objective by 
aiming to understand the European energy policy through a neoliberal institutionalist lens is mainly 
to understand intergovernmental cooperation and institutionalisation, which in this connection is 
decidedly focused on the states as actors operating within a certain legal framework (structure).  
However, as figure 2 reveals, other actors operating at the level of horizontal delegation also take 
active part in shaping the energy policy area. These actors, which we see as the new regulatory 
actors are the TSOs, who are constituted at the European level through ENTSOG, and the NRAs 
that are represented in the European agency ACER. The TSOs work at the European level through 
ENTSOG to promote the completion and functioning of the Internal Market and cross-border 
trade for gas in the EU (ENTSOG Homepage; Energinet.dk Homepage). Thus, most TSOs are 
involved in cooperation at the European level through their membership of ENTSOG, which is the 
institutional umbrella representing the TSOs in Brussels.  
The task of the NRAs is to monitor and regulate the actors on the energy market. The NRAs are 
involved at the European level through ACER. Both ENTSOG and ACER are engaged in close 
cooperation with the European Commission. Regulatory governance, as an incipient theoretical 
approach, provides explanatory power to understand the role of these new actors and their entrance 
on the playing field. The new regulatory actors can be typified as hybrids between agency and 
structure, since they are closely embedded in the new institutional structure within European energy 
policy. However, in the analysis we primarily regard them as actors, since we aim to analyse their 
interplay with the Member States and the Commission.   
2.4 Case selection: Nord Stream and its recognition as a European project 
The main argument for selecting Nord Stream as a case for this thesis originates from a question 
that actually triggered our interest in the concurrent development of European energy policy: How 
can it be that the European Union has recognised Nord Stream as a European project, despite the 
pipeline being heavily criticised and subject to disagreement between individual Member States? 
The idea is that an analysis of this apparent paradox should yield insight into the current state of 
European energy policy.   
The Nord Stream gas pipeline is being constructed from Vyborg in Russia to Greifswald in 
Germany through the Baltic Sea. The construction of the first of two lines was commenced in April 
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2010 and is foreseen completed during 2011 the construction of the second line is expected to 
begin in 2011 and finish in 2012. The pipeline capacity will be 55 bcm annually out of an annual 
Russian gas export to the EU of approximately 150 bcm (European Commission Homepage; Nord 
Stream Homepage a). Nord Stream is a joint venture between Russian and European stakeholders 
gathered in the Switzerland-based consortium Nord Stream AG. The stakeholders are OAO 
Gazprom (Russia), with a share of 51%, BASF SE/Wintershall Holding GmbH (Germany) and 
E.ON Ruhrgas (Germany) that each hold 15,5 percent, and N.V Nederlandse Gasunie (Holland) and 
GDF SUEZ S.A (France), which each have a 9 percent share (Nord Stream Homepage a).  
Source: Nord Stream Homepage b  
Nord Stream s immediate institutional link to the EU is its recognition of the pipeline as a project 
included in the EU programme: Trans-European Networks for Energy (TEN-E). The project was 
included for the first time in 2000 (Nord Stream Homepage c). After a revision of the TEN-E 
Programme in 2006, where a new list of projects was published, Nord Stream was again included - 
this time as a project of European interest (Council of the European Union 2006: Annex I).    
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework 
This chapter sets out to explain and investigate our theoretical framework, neoliberal 
institutionalism and regulatory governance. We discuss the strengths and weaknesses of applying 
neoliberal institutionalism and regulatory governance, and furthermore explicate how this 
theoretical framework provides a complimentary and multifaceted theoretical approach.  
3.1 Neoliberal Institutionalism in International Relations 
In this section, we discuss how the theory of neoliberal institutionalism places itself within the 
theoretical framework of international relations. We furthermore deliberate on the difficulties of 
intergovernmental cooperation and consider the importance of institutionalised cooperation. Finally, 
we discuss the latitude of institutions in changing states strategies towards international 
cooperation.  
Neoliberal institutionalism by Robert O. Keohane16 provides a comprehensive approach to 
understanding international relations and in particular intergovernmental cooperation and 
institutions. Thus, neoliberal institutionalism advances the idea that states can achieve mutual gains 
through cooperation, and therefore provides a more positive picture of the role of institutions than 
the prominent theory of neorealism17 (Lamy 2008).  
Keohane (1984) however notices that international institutions perennially will suffer from a lack of 
manifested authority compared to national institutions, since international institutions otherwise 
would come into conflict with national sovereignty. One could however argue that the EU, although 
often depicted as sui generis, does possess some characteristics, which supersede this partition 
                                                
16 This section will first and foremost take its point of departure in the theoretical deliberations of Robert O. Keohane, 
due to his role as one of the most conspicuous proponents of the neoliberal institutional school. The theoretical work of 
Keohane will however concurrently be supplemented by other research articles from both the institutional theoretical 
school and the neorealist school. 
17 While deliberating on the theory of neoliberal institutionalism, we concurrently compare it to some of the insights of 
neorealism, which the theory shares many characteristics with. Meanwhile, the most influential theoretical strand 
criticising neoliberal institutionalism is neorealism. This comparison is furthermore pivotal, as energy policy 
traditionally has been understood as a highly state-centred and securitised area of international politics, which 
neorealism is often applied to.  
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between national sovereignty and supranational power (Kirchner & Berk 2010; Sabel & Zeitlin 
2007).   
Somewhat contrary to neoliberal institutionalism, neorealism perceives international relations as a 
struggle for survival in a competitive environment, where states as functionally equal units might 
collaborate, but often are trapped in a prisoners dilemma with little prospect of long-term 
cooperation (Waltz 1979). Keohane (1984: 9) instead argues that cooperation can under some 
conditions develop on the basis of complementary interests, and that institutions, broadly defined, 
affect the patterns of cooperation that emerge .  
A central neoliberal institutionalist argument against neorealism is that neorealism s narrow focus 
on conflict and strife entices states (and scholars) not to pay due attention to the role of international 
institutions as mediators (Lamy 2008; Grieco 1988). Keohane (1984: 18) however accepts that in 
international relations, uncertainty is rife, making agreements is difficult, and no secure barriers 
prevent military and security questions from impinging on economic affairs .  
Despite this fairly neorealist depiction of international relations, neoliberal institutionalism 
emphasises how and why cooperation emerges and how institutions benefit partaking states without 
prescribing that cooperation is always advantageous (Hurrell 1995; Keohane 1984). Thus, neo-
liberal institutionalism could be seen as a middle-way approach to understanding international 
relations and cooperation. While accepting the basic propositions of neorealism that international 
relations are anarchic and states are rational, Keohane seeks to advance a theory that propagates the 
rationality of cooperation, even within a securitised issue-area such as energy (Keohane 198; 
Brown 1997; Lamy 2008). As Keohane (1984: 7) disputes, If international politics were a state of 
war, institutionalized patterns of cooperation on the basis of shared purposes should not exist 
except as part of a larger struggle for power (own accentuation). That shared purposes is a 
necessary basis for cooperation constitutes a vital part of the neoliberal institutionalist ideas of 
cooperation. Thus, although international competition is harsh, states have mutual interests, which 
can alleviate the ubiquitous international anarchy and prompt cooperation - often through 
institutions (Lamy 2008; Keohane 1984).  
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3.1.1 Why Cooperate in an Anarchic World? 
Realising that cooperation and especially building international institutions to foster cooperation is 
a long and intricate process, where problems of defection and cheating becomes of crucial 
importance, Keohane sets out to explain how these problems can be overcome. Thus, while 
neorealism argues that the predicament to cooperation between states is predetermined due to 
states vigilance of relative gain-considerations, neoliberal institutionalism subscribes to the 
contemplation that advanced industrial states also focus on absolute gains (Grieco 1988; Deudney 
& Ikenberry 1999). Keohane furthermore infers that states do not enter cooperation starry-eyed or 
necessarily fully voluntarily (Keohane 1984). More specifically, the design and purpose of 
cooperative institutions are often permeated by the interests of the strongest states, and should be 
comprehended chiefly as arrangements motivated by self-interest ( ) But regimes can also affect 
state interests, for the notion of self-interest is itself elastic and largely subjective (Keohane 1984: 
63). It is therefore not correct to portray actors involved in international institutions as starry-eyed 
idealists, but attention should rather be diverted towards understanding the mechanisms through 
which institutions become an intervening variable (Keohane 1984: 64). Thus, the information 
given through institutions could prove to be pivotal in changing courses of action, which otherwise 
in a clear-cut rational analysis of objective state interests would not be comprehended (Keohane 
1984). 
   
Cooperation can occur without an institutional framework, but international institutions do advance 
cooperation (Keohane 1984). Thus, institutionalised cooperation could seem to be an elevated level 
of cooperation, whereas much cooperation, albeit often not the optimal amount, takes place in less 
formalised settings between states (Keohane 1984).  
Keohane strongly posits that the term cooperation should be differentiated from harmony. Hence, if 
harmony rules - an unreal world - the need for cooperation is little, as there are no negative 
externalities of actions taken by one state to other states (Keohane 1984: 51). In other words, 
harmony provides fewer incentives for cooperation than conflict. As international politics have 
developed, the (economic) interdependence between states has induced an ever-increasing number 
of friction points and thereby also enhanced the potential for discord (Keohane 1984). As Keohane 
(2001: 1) argues in a more recent article, At worst, the effects of international interdependence 
include war ( ) interdependence and lack of governance make a deadly mixture . Discord is 
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nevertheless omnipotent to encourage cooperation, although cooperation remains more difficult 
where the discord is centred on security issues (Keohane 1984). Keohane (1984: 32) furthermore 
acknowledges that energy, as a scarce resource, is frequently shrouded in a discourse of security 
considerations18.  
Keohane argues that cooperation entails a process of policy coordination, wherein partakers adjust 
their strategies in order to accommodate other partakers preferences, and in this manner ensures 
accord and cooperation. However, this adaptation does not imply that international cooperation 
always produces optimal levels of welfare or that stronger cooperation is always beneficial 
(Keohane 1984: 11; Brown 1997). Thus, disentangling the problems of multiple equilibriums is not 
easy, which accordingly makes reciprocal beneficial cooperation difficult. Keohane (1984: 51f) 
however argues that intergovernmental cooperation takes place when the policies actually 
followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of their own 
objectives, as the result of a process of policy coordination . Thus, cooperation necessarily 
becomes easier, when perceived as beneficial to its partakers. We do however need to understand 
the mechanisms leading to such a process of policy coordination and how cooperation can 
supersede discord. 
3.1.2 Why Conflicts Prompt Policy Coordination  
The proposition of the prominent neorealist Kenneth Waltz (cf Keohane 1984: 52) that in anarchy 
there is no automatic harmony , leaves us with the question of how policy coordination can be 
achieved and what it entails in an anarchic world. Realising that harmony is seldom, we necessarily 
have to understand how states perceive discord and what their pertaining responses are. Keohane 
infers that when discord arises, states seek to get other states to change their strategies or 
preferences. Accepting that such a process is not always successful, conflict over policies does 
erupt. But as Keohane (1984: 54) argues, Cooperation should not be viewed as the absence of 
conflict, but rather as a reaction to conflict or potential conflict . Serious conflict could actually be 
necessary to prompt stronger cooperation (Keohane 1984).  
                                                
18 A central empirical proposition of Keohane, albeit from 1984, is that cooperation within energy does not need to lead 
to sovereignty problems, as much cooperation takes place through guidelines and informal coordination, thus relaxing 
the hierarchical rules of policy coordination (Keohane 1984).  
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Thus, policy coordination should not necessarily be seen as the result of benevolent states seeking 
to establish cooperation to secure collective goods. Instead, the state pursues what it perceives 
as its self-interest, but looks for bargains that can benefit all parties to the deal, though not 
necessarily equally (Keohane 1984: 52f). Therefore, Keohane also infers that cooperation - in 
contrast to a harmonious situation - should be perceived as decidedly political, as it requires a 
change of attitude and strategies by states seeking to evade potential conflict through cooperation. 
Although cooperation may be beneficial for all partakers, some states might seek to resist joining 
cooperation and instead aim for positional goods . Keohane stresses that this is especially the case 
within commercial cooperation. Thus, when neither power nor positional motivations are present, 
and when all participants would benefit in the aggregate from liberal trade, discord tends to 
predominate over harmony as the initial result of independent governmental action. (Keohane 
1984: 54). Therefore, policy coordination and cooperation inhibit strong political sentiments, as 
governments seek to protect national industrial actors. This appears to be relevant especially within 
energy policy, where national energy champions often exhibit significant influence on the 
domestic level (Keohane 1984). However, this protection often has negative externalities abroad, 
which imply a strong need for transnational policy coordination to prohibit further discord 
(Keohane 1984).  
Hence, one question arises: Which instruments can then be applied in order to induce transnational 
cooperation? Keohane (1984: 53) challenges the idea that persuasion and the power of good 
example alone can effectively change states preferences, arguing that a mix of threats and 
punishments as well as promises and rewards are more effective in attaining cooperative 
outcomes (Keohane 1984: 53). Implicitly in the quote lies an apparent emphasis on the role of 
power-relations in attaining international cooperation. Accordingly, Keohane warns about the 
dangers of casuistry, if international cooperation were to be understood as a fully voluntaristic 
business . Thus, one needs to recognise that a Voluntary choice does not imply equality of 
situation; in explaining outcomes, prior constraints may be more important than the process of 
choice itself (Keohane 1984: 71). In order to understand decisions to cooperate, one therefore 
needs to investigate the power-relations and structural milieu between the actors. Furthermore, one 
needs to understand the actors different opportunity costs when deciding to cooperate, which stem 
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from a power-relationship. Thus, the differentiated opportunity costs often cling to how much each 
party perceives a need for cooperation (Keohane 1984).  
Another designation of institutional cooperation could be to exclude others, which is why Keohane 
makes a point of stating that institutions are not always more beneficial than the overall costs they 
incur (Keohane 1984: 73). Thus, enticement to create international institutions can often be based 
on the advantage of exploiting others more effectively (Keohane 1984: 79). Nonetheless, 
institutions are more common where the density of a specific policy area induces a need for 
common rules to encumber the negative externalities stemming from individual decision-making 
and ad hoc-agreements (Keohane 1984). Consequently, according to Keohane (1984: 88), 
institutions should facilitate mutually beneficial agreements that would otherwise be difficult or 
impossible to attain . As we shall discover, institutions do however also change the rules of the 
game.  
3.1.3 Institutions  More Than a Playground for States 
Neoliberal institutionalism is closely related to other institutional theories, whilst maintaining 
certain neorealist characteristics. Thus, it is important to underline that Institutionalists do not 
elevate international regimes to mythical positions of authority over states , but still ascribe 
importance to the level of institutionalised cooperation, as opposed to mere anarchy (Keohane cf. 
Hurrell 1995: 61). Keohane specifically applies a modified structural approach, since he focuses on 
the constraints for state action and cooperation induced by the international system. He however 
differentiates his argument strongly from the neorealist school by contradicting the neorealist 
conception that institutions only have scant importance. Keohane (1984: 244) instead argues that 
institutions facilitate agreements, and decentralised enforcement of agreements among 
governments. They enhance the likelihood of cooperation by reducing the costs of making 
transactions that are consistent with the principles of the regime. They create the conditions for 
orderly multilateral negotiations, legitimate and delegitimate different types of state action, and 
facilitate linkages among issues within regimes and between regimes . Thus, accepting that state 
actors are egoistic and acting rationally, Keohane (1984) argues that states do have common 
interests. Institutions secure agreements between states, which otherwise would have been 
discarded. Thus, the high-quality information distributed through institutions can change actors 
strategies and prompt a better understanding of common interests. Realising that exchange of 
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information through institutions is not without hurdles, Keohane posits that if actors are reluctant or 
unable to provide the prescribed necessary and trustworthy information, their reputation and hence 
ability to secure confidence from other actors will be harmed (Keohane 1984). As institutions often 
create issue-linkage19, the possibility of sanctions is not necessarily restricted to one issue-area 
(Keohane 1984: 103f).   
Whereas the game-theoretical perspective of prisoner s dilemma is often employed to show the 
weakness of international cooperation, Keohane (1994: 103) infers that issue-linkage triggers what 
he calls iterated prisoner s dilemma 20. Thus, Keohane (1984: 103) argues that social pressure, 
exercised through linkages among issues, provides the most compelling set of reasons for 
governments to comply with their commitments . Therefore, the instrumental interdependence, 
which one could observe within the European energy policy, becomes vital, as former aberrant 
behaviour can serve to legitimise a lack of solidarity from other the Member States to an aberrant 
state in case of an energy crisis. Furthermore, situational interdependence21 seems to be clearly 
visible, as the internal market logic gets institutionalised within the European energy market. This 
rather precisely captures a central utility of international institutions, which encapsulates sets of 
implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor s 
expectations converge in a given area of international relations (Krasner cf. Keohane 1984: 57). 
Thus, aberrant behaviour by an actor could severely restrict future possibilities of beneficial 
cooperation. One should however not deduce that norms extend beyond self-interests. The concept 
of bounded rationality clarifies that neoliberal institutionalism does not perceive actors as 
omniscient actors, as their efforts to calculate consequences based on absolute rationality is 
unattainable (Keohane 1984: 111). Therefore, calculating whether future possibilities will be 
constrained due to aberrance could prove to be a difficult exercise.   
                                                
19 Issue-linkage refers to the proposition that institutions can secure cross-issue linkage, which entails that institutions 
can assemble a package of deals , making cheating less advantageous as states can punish cheating on a variety of 
issues (Mearsheimer 1995; Keohane 1984; Griffiths et al. 2009). 
20 Game theoretically, Keohane endeavours to show that with multiple prisoner s dilemmas linked together, as within an 
institution, the reciprocal punishment of potential defection will outlast the short-term benefits. This however requires 
that actors also focus on the long-run benefits (Keohane 1984). 
21 By situational interdependence Keohane targets the close interconnectedness of European markets. Thus, benefitting 
others does not have to be out of fear of retaliation, but rather that the actors are dependent on each other, not least 
economically. Hence, the spillover from a depressed national market to another national market is evident within the 
EU, not least exposed by the recent economic crisis (Keohane 1984). 
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As institutions are seen as decentralised without autonomous sanctioning abilities22, compliance 
with institutional rules or norms, when these do not correspond to the myopic self-interest of the 
state, remains a puzzle. Institutionalist scholars however argue that compliance compared to 
defection within institutions is preponderant23 (Keohane 1984).   
A central proposition of neoliberal institutionalism is that institutions facilitate nonsimultaneous 
exchange. In purely simultaneous exchange, neither party has to accept obligations, rules, or 
principles, since the exchange is balanced at every moment (Keohane 1984: 129). Institutions are 
not, according to Keohane, centralised enforcers of hierarchical international regimes24 with 
abilities similar to quasi-governments. Instead, the achievements of institutions should be seen in 
the patterns of informal negotiation that develop within them. Rules can be important as symbols 
that legitimize cooperation or as guidelines for them (Keohane 1984: 237).  
Judging institutions should perhaps rather be done from a governance perspective than from a pure 
state-centric perspective. In a more recent article, Keohane recognises that other actors than states 
also play a role in decision-making. Thus, actors without a direct stake in the issues under 
consideration may play important roles, as ( ) legislators often do on issues arising for decision 
through voting. In general, the legalization of rules ( ) requires the formation of durable rules 
that apply to classes of cases and puts interpretation and rule-application into the hands of third 
parties, whose authority depends on maintaining a reputation for impartiality (Keohane 2002: 11). 
Recognising that the European energy policy is a fragmented area of competences and structures, 
Keohane s theory provides a strong case for understanding the complexity of the intergovernmental 
and supranational levels of current efforts to establish a European energy policy.   
3.1.4 Summary 
Neoliberal institutionalism is closely adjoined to the main propositions of neorealism. Thus, taking 
into account the difficulties of cooperation in an anarchic world, Keohane seeks to establish the 
main foundations for a stronger scholarly credence to the role of international institutions. While 
                                                
22 Keohane infers that the sanctioning capabilities are still nested with the participating states, while institutions, just as 
providing information, give the possibility of coordinating the sanctions (Keohane 1984). 
23 Though non-compliance does not necessarily entail breakdown, the equation of benefits of cheating needs to include 
the sunken costs invested in the institution, if the outcome could be institutional breakdown (Keohane 1984).  
24 With international regimes, Keohane refers to rules, principles, norms and decision-making procedures (Keohane 
1984).  
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accepting that energy policy inhibits elements of national security as well as economic 
considerations, Keohane provides an approach suitable to understand the current institutionalisation 
of energy policy. Institutions disperse crucial information, which can overcome the traditional 
skepticism between self-interested states and ensure mutual gains. Cooperation is difficult to 
achieve, especially within securitised areas, but nevertheless takes place. The institutional impact is 
thus important to understand, as principles, norms and interests get embedded within an institutional 
setup, which changes the calculation of self-interests for the partakers. An important argument for 
institutional importance is that institutions create an iterated prisoner s dilemma, which accordingly 
makes issue-linkage important in securing observance of agreed policies and rules. Thus, defection 
and cheating, the central hindrances to cooperation, are less likely to appear, as sanctions become 
easier to apply across policy areas. One should however always note that cooperation is shrouded in 
a power-relation between the partakers, wherefore the institutional setup is chiefly decided by the 
strongest states. That institutions do develop is evident, and other actors might become central in 
day-to-day cooperation. Keohane does however not develop a more concise theoretical approach to 
understand how new types of governance and actors might erupt, as institutions evolve.  
In the following, we discuss how regulatory governance contributes to the understanding of 
institutions. We focus on regulatory governance, which concentrates on how delegation and policy 
coordination within institutions becomes multidimensional through horizontal delegation.  
3.2 Regulatory Governance  a Theoretical Framework 
The first part of this section discusses regulatory governance as a theoretical framework. This 
includes a discussion of new modes of governance and how regulatory governance stands in this 
perspective. By including the theoretical framework of regulatory governance, we aim to explore 
and analyse the type of governance through horizontal delegation that is taking place within the 
European energy policy. We furthermore theoretically discuss the roles of the different actors that 
conduct regulatory governance through horizontal delegation. 
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3.2.1 What is Regulatory Governance and Why Is It Taking Place? 
Whereas governance and regulation have traditionally been discussed separately, the increasing 
development of regulation, which is moving from a state level (government) to the supranational 
level (governance), suggests that the two concepts should be intertwined (Levi-Faur 2010).    
Governance is a rather broad concept that essentially stands in opposition to the notion of 
government . Whereas government refers to a unified policy-making structure with the state as 
the central actor in a hierarchical system, governance involves a multi-level structure, where several 
actors at different levels are involved in the policy-making process (Welch & Kennedy-Pipe 2004; 
Eberlein & Newman 2008; Conzelmann 2008). Moreover, as argued by several scholars, 
government is a process steered by the state, while governance can be a process that is de-centred or 
to some extent separate from the state (Majone 1994; Levi-Faur 2010; Black 2002). 
Regulatory governance focuses on a complex set of actors, e.g. in the form of regulatory agencies, 
which cannot necessarily be characterised as belonging either to the Member States or the 
supranational EU level (Majone 1994). Moreover, the study of regulatory governance implies a 
focus on the blurring of the distinction between the national and the supranational level (Levi-Faur 
2010). Thus, the regulatory governance process involves actors with rather ambiguous loyalty 
affiliation, where the loyalty does not necessarily lie at either the national level or the supranational 
level (Nikolaides in Eberlein & Newman 2008).  
A classical definition of regulation is state-centred, functioning by way of the command and 
control of legal rules, and enforced by means of sanctioning (Black 2002: 2). However, more 
recent studies suggest a decentring of regulation, due to increased institutionalisation of regulation 
into transnational institutions. Moreover, this process of decentring is fostered by the cross-border 
nature of many policy issues (Black 2002; Majone 1994).   
A Regulatory State in Europe 
The concept of the regulatory state was put forward by Majone (1994) as a way to comprehend 
the EU as a regulatory power. Majone (1994) argues that while the European Commission may find 
an interest in increasing EU competences, the governments may also concurrently have an interest 
in delegating regulatory power to the supranational level, as intergovernmental agreements often 
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possess little reliability. Majone (1994) furthermore argues that regulation is needed in order to 
ensure a better functioning market, that is to correct market failures and counterbalance negative 
externalities25. 
Levi-Faur (2010: 5) argues that regulation ( ) not only is a distinct type of policy but also entails 
identifiable forms and patterns of political conflict that differ from the patterns that are regularly 
associated with policies of distribution and redistribution . Thus, he builds a bridge between 
regulation and governance in the sense that regulation is not an autonomous self-regulating 
process, but is subject to different interests and influence by various actors. Moreover, regulation is 
highly political and should be analysed in the context of general political trends.    
Many new modes of governance have in common that they do not imply a formal shift of national 
sovereignty from the Member States to the EU (Borrás & Jacobsson 2004; Littoz-Monnet 2010). 
However, in order to compensate for the need for European regulation, which arises due to the 
increasingly transnational nature of certain policy issues, horizontal delegation is often chosen as 
the solution in order to preserve formal Member State competences in the specific policy area 
(Eberlein & Newman 2008). This is a solution, which implies horizontal delegation of government 
competences to subnational authorities involved in EU-level cooperation through regulatory 
networks.   
Horizontal delegation is needed in order to close the supranational regulatory gap - a gap that 
has arisen as a result of the increasingly European nature of certain policy issues and the lack of EU 
competences to deal with these issues, which are often of national sensitivity (Eberlein & Grande 
2005: 89; Eberlein & Newman 2008). Furthermore, horizontal delegation is seen as a way to 
compensate for incomplete international vertical integration (Eberlein & Newman 2008: 26). 
This means that since harmonisation is not a possibility, due to Member States vigilance towards 
transferring sovereignty in areas of national sensitivity, horizontal delegation is a way to enhance 
cooperation, while still respecting the EU s principle of subsidiarity. However, while the principle 
of subsidiarity might be respected in legal terms, the governance process potentially fosters a 
blurring between the national and supranational levels in the day-to-day practice of these networks.  
                                                
25 An argument from Majone (1994) is that regulatory governance often targets multinational companies, who see an 
interest in a supranational level of regulation in order to avoid having to comply with differentiated national regulations. 
This supranational level of regulation accordingly provides better opportunities for transnational market integration. 
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3.2.2 Regulatory Governance  What Kind of Process? 
In the spirit of multi-level governance, regulatory governance deals with the decentralisation or 
delegation of governance away from the state into a new framework of European policy-making in 
two ways (Levi-Faur 2010; Héritier & Lehmkuhl 2008): Firstly, governance competences are 
moved downwards to actors (with expertise) at the subnational level engaged in EU-wide 
cooperation. Secondly, competences are moved upwards to the supranational level. Both processes 
imply a potential loss of governance capability at the Member State level (Conzelmann 2008; 
Eberlein & Newman 2008).    
Héritier & Lehmkuhl (2008: 1) provide an example of how this can play out in practice, as they 
distinguish between sectoral governance and territorially bounded democratic government . 
Traditionally, policy-making functions would be the responsibility of the territorially bounded 
democratic government. However, Héritier & Lehmkuhl (2008:9) argue that sectoral 
governance 26 is emerging in technically complex policy areas, where the government lacks 
expertise to solve the problems alone (Shapiro 2004). Therefore, governments accept that policy 
formulation is lifted from the national level to a European-level policy framework, in which 
nationally designated technical experts gets increasingly involved, even in the process of policy 
formulation (Héritier & Lehmkuhl 2008).   
There are different explanations as to why the process of horizontal delegation takes place. Héritier 
& Lehmkuhl (2008) for instance argue that delegation takes place either as a result of lack of 
expertise of Member State officials, or as a consequence of lack of time or of political attention.  
On the other hand, Eberlein & Newman s (2008) approach can be said to follow the 
neofunctionalist logic of spill-over. In their article on incorporated transgovernmental networks in 
the EU, they argue that horizontal delegation is taking place as the result of deliberate action by the 
Member States to strengthen transnational coordination. Furthermore, they argue that horizontal 
delegation take place as a result of functional interdependence due to increasing EU integration, 
which generates a greater need for policy coordination (Eberlein & Newman 2008: 26). 
Moreover, Eberlein (2008) concludes that the Commission has an interest in this development, 
since the Commission regards horizontal delegation of rule-making to sub-state regulatory agencies 
                                                
26 Héritier & Lehmkuhl (2008:1) define sectoral governance as policy formulation by private and/or public actors in 
delimited sectoral areas, which takes place outside the main political legislative avenue of decision-making .  
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as a way to break the institutional deadlock, which has arisen as a result of the gap between the 
objective of completing the Internal Market and the lack of institutional mechanisms to live up to 
this objective. Furthermore, Eberlein (2008) argues that by bringing a variety both public and 
private actors into the governance process, the Commission strengthens the legitimacy of this 
regulatory governance structure.   
Eberlein & Newman (2008) argue that regulatory networks within European energy policy are an 
added component to the EU system. On the other hand, Levi-Faur argues that regulatory 
governance can lead to such a strong institutionalisation of the regulatory agency that it even 
becomes a separate governance structure. Moreover, the agency s role and position in between
levels becomes taken for granted, wherefore the regulatory agency develops into a distinct policy 
space (Levi-Faur 2010). Héritier & Lehmkuhl (2008: 6) furthermore argue that horizontal 
delegation can lead to agency shirking , in the sense that the governance agency will increase its 
internal cooperation, while distancing itself from the Member States and even the Commission.  
3.2.3 Horizontal Delegation in a Principal-Agent Perspective 
Horizontal delegation does not operate in the total absence of hierarchy or of politicisation, 
although these characteristics are formally less distinctly manifested than in a governance structure, 
where there is a clear separation of the national and supranational competences (Eberlein & 
Newman 2008). Héritier & Lehmkuhl (2008) and Eberlein (2008) thus argue that the regulatory 
governance agency operates under a shadow of hierarchy , which can stem from either the 
Member State or Commission or both. They find that in a regulatory governance-setting, depending 
on the subject matter, both the Member State and the Commission act as principal , since there is a 
gap between the formal national competences and the need for closer cooperation at the European 
level (Héritier & Lehmkuhl 2008; Eberlein 2008). Significant importance is ascribed to the 
Commission s role as the agenda-setter - due to its right of initiative - of regulatory governance 
(Héritier & Lehmkuhl 2008; Eberlein 2008). In his study of regulatory networks within European 
energy policy, Eberlein (2008) argues that the Commission can threaten the regulatory agency with 
new legislation in order to make the agency more willing to comply with pro-competition policies. 
A similar argument is found with Börzel (2010: 198), who argues that supranational 
centralisation is taking place within EU regulatory governance; hence, the Commission can take 
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legally binding decisions without the consent of the Member States e.g. in cases relating to 
competition law. Thus, the Commission can use the internal market agenda as a tool to balance 
Member State resistance against further integration. The Member State can also work as the 
principal by limiting the authority and competences of the regulatory agency, if the agency, 
according to the Member State, becomes too independent (Eberlein & Newman 2008: 44).  
3.2.4 Summary 
Regulatory governance is not a full-fledged theoretical framework, but is a rather new approach to 
study the process of horizontal delegation from the state towards the supranational level. The 
literature suggests that there is a gap between the intergovernmental and supranational levels of 
cooperation in certain policy areas, which results from a lack of means (e.g. expertise) to comply 
with the increasingly transnational character of many policy areas. Horizontal delegation is 
regarded as a way to close this gap. Regulatory governance deals with the decentralisation and 
recentralisation of traditional government functions towards a new supranational policy space. This 
does not necessarily imply a shift of formal national power to the supranational level. Moreover, it 
opens up for a rethinking of the principal-agent perspective in the shadow of hierarchy, since 
regulatory governance can influence the roles of the actors in the transnational policy structure. 
3.3 The Three-Stage Rocket of the EU Energy Policy and the Theoretical 
Framework 
Neoliberal institutionalism and regulatory governance can be perceived as complementary, although 
they provide different insights into the functioning of intergovernmental cooperation and 
international institutions.  
Neoliberal institutionalism provides a set of theoretical tools to understand two levels of what we 
see as a three-stage rocket of EU energy policy: 1) the emergence of intergovernmental 
cooperation and 2) the process of institutionalisation within the energy policy. The theory, however, 
lacks explanatory power as to 3) how regulatory governance processes within institutions take place 
and by which mechanisms they operate.  
Regulatory governance, on the other hand, cannot account for the preconditions for 
intergovernmental cooperation. Instead, it presupposes that a delegation of competences takes 
place. It can provide us with a theoretical framework to understand the relationship between the 
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regulatory actors vis-à-vis the Member States and the Commission. In addition, the regulatory 
aspect is relevant, since the European dimension of the energy policy area is in the making and it 
can therefore be difficult to analyse actual policy results of this development.  
Our approach will therefore be focused on providing a balanced approach to the employment of 
these theories. We recognise that neoliberal institutionalism and regulatory governance essentially 
target different stages/levels. The selection of two types of theory with different foci is however 
intentional, insofar as our research area calls for an understanding of the complex interplay of actors 
and policies in order to investigate the development of the European energy policy.  
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Chapter 4: Analysis  The Development of the European Energy 
Policy and the EU Recognition of Nord Stream 
The analysis is divided into four correlated sections, by which we aim at discussing the 
development of the European energy policy and how the development corresponds with the EU 
recognition of Nord Stream. Whereas sections 4.1 and 4.2 discuss the policy development, section 
4.3 specifically address the introduction of new actors, which due to the institutionalisation 
discussed in the two first sections obtain a regulatory role within the EU energy policy.   
In section 4.1, we discuss the dominant trends, which we observe within the European energy 
policy. In this connection, we analyse the two concurrent trends of liberalisation and securitisation 
and connect these to the overall discussion on the challenges of establishing a European dimension 
of energy policy. This chapter furthermore provides the contextual background for the identification 
of the three principles of security of supply, diversification and solidarity within EU energy policy. 
In section 4.2, we analyse how the three principles are defined by different stakeholders and how 
the principles are functionally incorporated into the European energy policy. Specifically, we focus 
on how the principles are weighed within the European energy policy and how they can be seen as 
the policy expression of the two trends.  
In section 4.3, we address the regulatory governance in the making within the European energy 
policy. Thus, we discuss how the introduction of new regulatory actors within the European energy 
policy perhaps changes the name of the game . We therefore also elaborate on how the two trends 
shape the work of these regulatory actors. 
In section 4.4, we scrutinise the EU recognition of the disputed pipeline project Nord Stream and 
analyse how the development of the European energy policy, shaped by the two trends, correlates 
with the debate that has emerged around the construction of Nord Stream. The EU recognition of 
Nord Stream will be scrutinised in order to comprehend the relation between state-centred energy 
practices and the EU energy policy development.  
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4.1 The EU Energy Policy - Balancing Securitisation and Liberalisation  
In this section, we aim to analyse the development of the European energy policy27 from the early 
1990 s to present with an emphasis on the two trends of securitisation28 and liberalisation. We seek 
to explain the dialectic relations between these trends, as we perceive them to have been of crucial 
importance to the development of the energy dimension of European cooperation. This analysis 
discusses the challenges29 that have surfaced during the development of the European energy 
policy30. It furthermore takes into account the immanent discussion on internal liberalisation vis-à-
vis a stronger role for the EU towards external suppliers.  
Subsequently, we discuss the European response to the problems of energy policy integration.  We 
furthermore seek to investigate the emergence of three principles of European energy policy: 
security of supply, solidarity and diversification. This focus will be based on the prevalent 
discussion on the two trends, as the principles in our view could be seen as a response trying to 
capture the problems of transferring Member State competences to the EU.   
4.1.1 The Hardships of European Energy Policy Integration 
The EU was founded on the basis of energy cooperation through the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) and EURATOM, and many observers have sought to eulogise the idea of a 
European energy policy. Little progress was however made within this policy area until the early 
1990 s (Eberlein 2010; Belyi 2003; Belyi 2009; Matláry 1997; I9 2010). Prior to the 1990 s, the 
Member States strategy was mainly to ensure energy independence in relation to external energy 
suppliers, while avoiding strong supranational steering from Brussels (van der Linde 2007). Draft 
chapters on European energy policy were concurrently removed from the different EU-treaties of 
the period (Belyi 2009; Eikeland 2004). As the European Commission (2000) openly pointed out in 
                                                
27 Theoretically, we approach this section of the analysis within the framework of neoliberal institutionalism, as the 
section primarily focuses on the institutional development of cooperation between the EU Member States and the 
European Commission. 
28 By the term securitisation, we do not refer to the elaborate theoretical Copenhagen School of securitisation (see e.g. 
Wæver 2010). Instead we use the term as a concept for understanding security considerations, high politics , within the 
development of the European energy policy.  
29 The analysis primarily targets the overall development of European energy policy with due regard to the problems of 
transferring competences from a national setting to a supranational level within a policy field characterised by state 
sovereignty and difficulties of transnational cooperation. 
30 We therefore do not attempt to provide a chronological picture of the range of policy papers and directives crafted 
since the early 1990 s.   
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2000, attempts to include a chapter on energy, during the negotiations on the Maastricht and 
Amsterdam Treaties, ended in failure 31.  
The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 and the provisions of the Internal Market however provided some 
manoeuvre room for the Commission to find new ways to ensure a role for the EU in handling 
future energy challenges (de Jong & van der Linde 2008; Eikeland 2004; KP). The Commission 
instigated an institutional role of their own as a policy driver with support from the Internal Market 
directives (Eberlein 2010; FK). As an independent Danish energy expert (I9 2010: A2), who is 
working closely together with the Commission, states: The Commission has seen that if a Member 
State only solves the problems within its [the Member State s] own national setting, then ( ) you 
just transfer the problems to the neighbouring country. Therefore, the Commission has sought to 
keep the overview of the situation, while the Member States mostly have taken into consideration 
their own interests . Especially Germany is pinpointed as having been among the most reluctant 
Member States towards establishing a stronger European dimension within energy policy (I2 2010; 
I9 2010). According to a German energy representative, this should be seen in the perspective of the 
different national energy market structures within the EU. As the representative (I3 2010: A5) 
states: There are of course different starting points for different Member States ( ) So of course 
there were different views from different Member States. Some countries supported the proposals 
for more liberalisation others did not . The efforts to complete the Internal Market did however 
dissipate into the sphere of energy policy, despite exertion by the Member States and their gas 
industry to ensure that the market liberalisation did not take overhand (Matláry 1997; Eberlein 
2010). As an energy representative from the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (I6 2010: A1) 
bluntly expounds: Still a lot of governments, to be honest, think that it [energy] is such a strategic 
sector ( ) that if they keep their national enterprises it would be the best solution . The 
liberalisation efforts throughout the 1990 s did consequently not find much support from neither the 
Member States nor the gas industry (de Jong 2008). As the Polish energy representative (I6 2010: 
A1) states: It was extremely difficult, because from one side the enterprises of course are very 
powerful ( ) And the governments did not have a lot of willingness and a lot of wishes to let 
enterprises behave in a more open and really competitive way ( ) They [the enterprises] were 
always treated like a special cow . The EU s and especially the Commission s approach was 
                                                
31 Explanations to this failure range from discussions on problems associated with the Member States different energy 
mixes and national sovereignty issues to the problem of introducing a unanimous voting structure within the EU on 
energy policy (Commission 2000; Röller et al 2007).  
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therefore to seek to break down these national energy monopolies, which were considered to be 
causing market failures. This should ensure a better market integration and prospectively stronger 
support for European rather than national energy solutions (Matláry 1997; de Jong & van der 
Linde 2008). The Member States were however worried that liberalisation would harm their 
national security of supply a principle, which had had overarching importance for the 
development of the energy policy during the previous decades. The liberalisation efforts did not 
least take a strong hit, as security of supply got introduced as a Public Service Obligation32. This 
legitimised Member State neglect of the market principles in order to balance national security 
concerns (Eikeland 2004). The stark opposition from the largest energy Member States headed by 
Germany, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom furthermore implied that other Member 
States became doubtful, as to whether the EU system would be able to address their supply 
security problems (Eikeland 2004: 31; Eikeland 2008).   
Despite Member State reluctance to liberalise the market33, the process did continue and progress 
was achieved not least due to intense interaction between the European Council and the 
Commission. This progress was for instance shown in different strategic energy reviews, often in 
the form of benchmarking reports and policy papers, revealing the lack of liberalisation within the 
individual Member States (I6 2010; Eikeland 2004; European Commission 2007; European 
Commission 2008). Namely the benchmarking reports were used as a major new tool to show 
that the liberalisation process had encountered serious obstacles, especially due to the lack of 
unbundling (Eikeland 2008: 13). This could seem as a way to apply pressure on the Member States 
to conform to the agreed commitments. Thus, the Commission was able to gather some support for 
institutionalising stronger measures to ensure a liberalised energy market and partially break down 
national monopolies (Eikeland 2008). Theoretically, the use of benchmarking reports should be 
understood as an essential part of institutionalised cooperation. Hence, the role of institutions is, 
according to Keohane, exactly to disperse high-quality information, which accordingly makes 
defection and cheating less viable. Thus, the benchmarking reports could be seen both as a 
functional approach, by which commitments to institutional rules are investigated - and a naming 
                                                
32
 We elaborate on this obligation in section 4.2. 
33 For instance, 11 out of 12 Member States turned down a proposal from the European Commission in 1994 to 
liberalise the energy market (Svein Andersen 2000).  
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and shaming game in which adherence to common norms and principles is scrutinised and 
exposed.   
4.1.2 A Cooperative Road to a European Energy Policy 
The Commission could have resorted to its direct competition law power34 stemming from the 
Internal Market legislation, in order to force faster liberalisation through but chose not too. 
According to Eikeland (2004: 11), competition law and backing by a decision by the European 
Court of Justice within telecommunications gave the Commission competences to enforce 
directives without the approval of the Council with regards to market opening and the dismantling 
of monopolies. The Commission however instead opted for extensive negotiations with member 
state representatives and experts in working groups  based on art. 100a of the Treaty - a consensus-
driven approach - with the support of most of the involved actors (Eikeland 2004: 5; Eikeland 
2008). This approach was, according to Eberlein, chosen within the shadow of Community law , 
as the Commission did not spare efforts to make clear throughout the negotiation rounds that it had 
the opportunity to apply the aforementioned competition law power (Eberlein 2010: 63; Eikeland 
2004).  
The central theoretical notion to understand in this regard is the fragility of the attempts to establish 
a European energy policy. Thus, as pointed out in section 3.1.1, Keohane (1984) would sustain the 
argument that the involved states would not establish a stronger institutional setup without some 
prior agreement as to the scope of cooperation. The fact that the Commission did not just push for 
immediate liberalisation based on Community law therefore makes sense, as the development of the 
European energy policy should be seen as a constant process of bargaining. Instead, efforts were 
made to disclose the advantages of stronger institutionalised cooperation through a variety of policy 
papers, wherein the principle of security of supply was emphasised as a potential driver for further 
integration (see e.g. European Commission 1995 & European Commission 2000; I9 2010). As a 
Danish energy expert (I9 2010: A2) argues: Security of supply is something that everybody wants 
to talk about .   
Neoliberal institutionalism points to the fact that a strategy of showing the benefits of cooperation, 
such as the Commission s strategy, combined with implicit threats of legal action are more 
                                                
34 In this regard, articles 85, 86 and 90 EEC provide room for the Commission to start procedures to disassemble 
monopolies and other dominant market positions, which interfere with the principles of the Internal Market (Eikeland 
2008: 18).   
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effective in attaining cooperative outcomes rather than hoping for change of behaviour due to 
fully voluntaristic behaviour (Keohane 1984: 53). The Commission thus used the latent threat of 
legal actions to foster cooperation from the Member States35. Eikeland (2004: 32) does however 
argue that the Commission received early warnings from the Member States indicating that any 
such strategy would be met with vociferous opposition . The fact that the Commission did not 
resort to legal procedures is therefore explainable, according to neoliberal institutionalism, as the 
purpose and structure of the institution largely rests upon the interests, though often elastic, of the 
participating states (Keohane 1984). Hence, an approach based solely on court cases could 
potentially have had incurred damages to the possibilities of further developing the institutional 
cooperation. Thus, the liberalisation of the energy market did not come underway through 
voluntaristic behaviour, but should rather be seen as a complex game of power relations, wherein 
threats of further legislative procedures proved more efficient than the power of the good .  
The Third Liberalisation Package of 200936 went to lengths to ensure the enforcement of the 
provisions already negotiated in the two previous packages (199837 & 200338) for market 
liberalisation. As the Polish energy representative (I6 2010: A1) explains: The Third Package ( ) 
proposed a really very far-reaching and very detailed market intervention, which means that now 
this sector is in a process of being imposed a number of very very strict economic rules, which 
should be introduced into the market. Not through normal market-driven factors, but through 
legislation . A marked shift could thus be seen from the early approach based on negative 
integration to a more regulation-based positive integration approach39. The Second Liberalisation 
Package (2003) was, as Eikeland (2008: 1) states arranged for voluntary harmonisation of rules 
and practices preventing trade across member states, while the new [Third] package proposed to 
set up an EU-level agency [ACER] with the powers to mandate such harmonisation . The 
                                                
35 The theoretical framework of Keohane primarily focuses upon the role of threats, when applied in bargains between 
states, but does in this context also provide an understanding of the Commission s approach as an executive . 
36
 Council of the European Union 2009a. 
37
 Council of the European Union 1998 
38
 Council of the European Union 2003 
39 While negative integration entails striking down national rules and practices which obstruct or prevent achievement 
of the internal market , positive integration implies the modification of existing laws and institutions either by 
harmonization or the creation of new laws (Foster 2006: 260). 
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introduction of ACER could thus be seen as the avatar of a change from a strategy of negative 
integration to positive integration40. 
4.1.3 Relegating a Securitised External Dimension for Internal Liberalisation 
Although national energy policies usually comprise both an internal and external dimension, the EU 
initially only set out to further the internal energy policy integration, while leaving the difficult 
external dimension - relations with third country suppliers - aside41 (de Jong & van der Linde 2008; 
Keukeleire & Macnaughtan 2008). As the European Commission (2006: 14) stated: The 
effectiveness and coherence of the EU s external energy policy is dependent upon the progress with 
internal policies and, in particular, the creation of the internal market for energy . First and 
foremost, the strategy of primarily focusing on liberalising the internal European energy markets 
should be seen in relation to the fact that the external dimension of energy policy is closely 
intertwined with foreign and security policy an area that the EU at the time did not possess 
significant competences within (Keukeleire & Macnaughtan 2008). The opposition against 
transferring further competences from the national level to the EU-level was, among other factors, 
sparked by the fact that the energy market until the new millennium was a buyer s market, which 
implied that there was little fear of disruptions of the energy supply (van der Linde 2007).  
However, the change from a buyer s to a seller s market 42 in the EU had further repercussions for 
the efforts to consolidate a European energy policy. As van der Linde (2007: 267) states: 
Arguably, the switch from an international oil and gas buyer s market to a seller s market ( ) 
stimulated a certain preference for bilateral energy relations over multilateral ones in some 
consumer countries in an attempt to secure supplies . Thus, security of supply was engaged as a 
bilateral matter, wherein each Member State accordingly took care of its own security of supply 
often through deals with third country suppliers, while blocking any competence-transfer to the 
                                                
40 In section 4.3, we go in to depth with the functions and importance of the introduction of regulatory actors 
(comprising ACER) within the governance process of European energy policy. 
41 The EU did however conclude an agreement on a European Energy Charter with Russia, other CIS-states, Canada 
and the US, which sought to align these states markets with the European market structure. Until today little progress 
has been achieved, as few of the CIS-states as producer-oriented states has been interested in seeking a totally 
liberalised market structure as in the EU. Russia, as the biggest external supplier, remained obdurate rejecting the 
Charter proposal despite political pressure from the EU in 2006 (de Jong & van der Linde 2008; Kirchner & Berk 2010; 
Walker 2007).    
42
 The decline in domestic gas resources and the increased focus on climate change entailed an increased dependency on 
external gas suppliers. As gas is perceived as a cleaner energy resource than oil, a shift towards gas consumption, 
which was in line with the climate agenda, induced a stronger market position for external suppliers (van der Linde 
2008). 
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Commission within the area of security of supply (Eikeland 2004). Theoretically, neoliberal 
institutionalism could shed some light on this development. First of all, one has to identify some of 
the problems of the lack of institutional development at the EU-level. Thus, since the European 
capitals realised that the structure of the energy market was effectively changing - empowering the 
suppliers and making the consumers vulnerable - energy was increasingly cast as high politics . 
This implied more strategic securitised considerations. Consequently, the efforts of the EU to 
introduce an internal energy market clashed with the increasing qualms of the Member States, 
regarding whether or not the market could take care of a sector of such pivotal strategic 
importance. The energy policy was furthermore shaped by the fact that the majority of gas 
resources are located outside the EU, which implies strategic bargaining with external partners, 
such as Russia (Röller et al. 2007). This raises questions concerning the vulnerability of national 
energy dependence, which again had certain defining characteristics for the different attitudes of the 
Member States. As an example, Germany, a notoriously foot-dragging player within European 
energy policy, did not see its dependence on Russia as particularly alarming due to Russia s 
dependence on exporting to the sizable German market and the good relations with Russia. So even 
though Germany due to its market size have a strong dependence on Russian supplies, Germany 
sees its vulnerability as less threatening, as it still holds vital bargaining power bilaterally towards 
Russia. On the other hand, smaller and more vulnerable states with a bad track record with Russian 
external energy politics and 100% gas dependency on Russian supplies, such as Lithuania, perceive 
a common European approach as the only solution to enhance their bargaining power (Kirchner & 
Berk 2010; Bult 2010; I7 2010).    
A hard task for the Commission was therefore to find a course for the development of a European 
energy policy, which would induce the Member States to see the gains to be derived from stronger 
intra-EU cooperation; cooperation which should imply less competition for external supplies. 
Energy competition, Larsson (2007:47f) argues, always has its losers , while the winners are the 
suppliers. In this regard, the dependence on Russian gas, handled by the state-owned monopoly 
Gazprom, could give rise to problems (Kirchner & Berk 2010; Baran 2007). As Röller et al. (2007: 
14) argue, In such situations, energy policy might be used as one more tool available to the 
government to achieve its goals. In this sense, energy policy cannot be analysed in isolation from 
other government objectives. Therefore, given the possible multiple ends of energy policy, outcomes 
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can be unpredictable . According to neoliberal institutionalism, institutionalised cooperation, such 
as within the European energy policy, could counterbalance the uncertainty of outcomes from 
government control of national producer companies. However, it was and remains an immense task 
for the Member States to acknowledge that promoting a European response to the problem of 
unreliable energy suppliers could be the answer to their security concerns. Although many 
observers focus on the tendency of energy becoming securitised, we sustain the argument that this 
is not necessarily a recent development, since energy has always been a matter of state security (see 
e.g. Ciuta 2010; Kirchner & Berk 2010; Kurze (2008). What makes the development within the EU 
distingué is essentially the framing of energy as a European rather than as a national concern, 
through an institutional emphasis on liberalisation. Thus, as a concurrent move, we find that despite 
the security concerns and talks of dependency-vulnerability, the efforts made at the European level 
have essentially been focused on prompting stronger market integration. This has been done by 
seeking to instigate concrete mechanisms to ensure the reliability of energy supply in order to 
withstand future gas crises.   
The primary target of the EU energy packages from the first directive in 1998 to the Third 
Liberalisation package of 2009 was to regulate the national (often monopolistic) markets in order to 
achieve full-fledged liberalisation of the market43. Breaking down the national monopolies and 
opening the market for other suppliers could theoretically be a sound solution to the resistance 
against transferring energy policy competences to the European level. Thus, as Keohane posits, 
growing economic integration and national protection of energy champions engenders controversy 
and discord (Keohane 1984). Discord, accordingly, is a necessity for inducing international 
cooperation, as it enlightens the need for policy coordination. With the opening of the market and 
the growing emphasis on interconnecting the markets one would expect greater discord, albeit also 
a greater need for policy coordination, as negative externalities, due to the growing trans-European 
interdependence, spread from the decisions taken in one Member State to the other Member States. 
As a result, states should be willing to engage in more institutionalised cooperation in order to 
secure their national interests. While not changing the name of the game - that states have to 
                                                
43 A central difference was however that the first gas directive did not contain provisions requiring unbundling of 
transmission system operators (TSOs) and producer companies, which was only introduced with the Second 
Liberalisation Package from 2003. The Third Liberalisation Package however introduced concrete provisions for the 
unbundling process, as there was a clear lack of progress in this regard after the Second Liberalisation Package (I4 
2010). 
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ensure their own security of supply - the development of an integrated market seems to be an 
indirect way of amassing support for stronger supranational coordination.   
A main obstacle to the development of a stronger EU energy policy was however the lack of 
effective policy instruments at the EU-level, due to the dearth of Member State concessions (KP; 
Eikeland 2004). Although the Commission throughout the 1990 s chiefly approached energy policy 
with a liberalisation agenda, energy remained difficult to relegate to a simple commodity without 
taking the security implications of energy into account (Kirchner & Berk 2010). Thus, as Keohane 
argues no secure barriers prevent military and security questions from impinging on economic 
affairs (Keohane 1984: 18). The question is whether this problem of framing energy policy solely 
within a market agenda stems from a structural challenge posed to all states, namely to ensure 
adequate supplies of energy in a world of scarce resources and constant competition. Therefore, one 
could argue that the attempts to depict energy as a simple commodity in a competitive international 
environment naturally would inhibit certain challenges to establishing a European energy agenda. 
As de Jong and van der Linde (2008: 1) argue, Very often, economic issues are elevated to the 
political-strategic level, serving a different agenda than merely contributing to the energy policy 
agenda of the EU . Thus, this quote exemplifies one of our central arguments, namely that it has 
become increasingly difficult for the European policy-makers to frame energy solely as a market 
commodity, and thereby separating it from the strategic security-level.  
4.1.4 A New Millennium: Coalescing Market Liberalisation and Securitisation? 
The EU energy market arguably changed tremendously from 2000. A growing awareness of the 
energy-vulnerability of the Member States coincided with the biggest enlargement in the history of 
the EU in 2004 (Eikeland 2004). With the inclusion of 10 new Central and Eastern European 
Member States, the energy mix/structure of the EU changed significantly and exposed the 
weaknesses of the internal EU energy market. The Baltic States are for instance characterised as 
energy islands with no connection to the EU energy market, and furthermore effectively 
dependent on Russia as a supplier of energy44 (European Commission 2006: 6; Riley 2008; de Jong 
& van der Linde 2008). This development did together with the rise of a new Russia - sparked by 
the rising energy prices seriously question the viability of the European dependency on Russia 
                                                
44 Gazprom is furthermore the largest or second largest owner of gas facilities in the Baltic States. This further 
illustrates the Baltic States energy predicament (Baran 2007). 
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(Kirchner & Berk 2010). The new Member States - especially Poland and the Baltic States, due to 
historic scars - did in this connection not refrain from publicly warning against starry-eyed 
dependence on Russia (Walker 2007).  
The debate about the EU s dependence on external suppliers, often volatile states, gained new 
impetus with the gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 (Röller et al. 2007). The short-term 
halt of gas deliveries from Russia through the Brotherhood pipeline via Ukraine to the EU gave a 
serious blow to the confidence in Russia as a supplier and Ukraine as a transit country, although 
different explanations were given as the reason for the crisis45. The public explanation was 
however disagreement about the prices that Ukraine had to pay Gazprom for the gas  (Kirchner & 
Berk 2010; Spanjer 2007). What enhanced the crisis repercussions for the EU s security of supply 
was furthermore that as the pressure in the pipelines fell, the Member States en route secured their 
own supply, which accordingly lowered the amount of gas transferred on through the pipeline46 
(BBC Homepage). One needs to understand the dynamics behind this response by the Member 
States. The argument of Keohane that a preponderant obstacle to cooperation is defection seems to 
have some pertinence in this case. Thus, the insecurity about who took what and how much did 
imply serious concerns regarding the extent of intra-European solidarity and in this sense also the 
security of supply. Whether it should be called defection, or simply just lack of information, is 
however difficult to contend. But as discussed in section 3.1.1, neoliberal institutionalism 
emphasises that the very existence of institutionalised cooperation rests upon the fact that the high-
quality information dispersed can alternate the possible courses of action of the states. The 
magnitude of the institutional cooperation at the time was however limited. This entailed Europe-
wide concerns regarding how to handle future energy crises within a spirit of solidarity . 
The gas crisis of 2006 and the subsequent gas crisis of 200947 fostered a new direction for European 
energy policy. As the Slovak energy representative (I5 2010: A4) states: the crisis was a slap in 
our face. So then we just woke up, and especially Slovakia as a transit country, we thought this 
would never happen, and it just happened like that and we were cut off the gas . The idea that 
                                                
45 We do not intend to go further in to the gas crisis and the reasons for the disruption of supplies to the EU. The crisis 
instead mainly serves as a background for understanding the securitisation of security of supply within the EU energy 
policy. 
46 In this respect it should be noted that Ukraine also siphoned large amounts of the gas intended for Europe through 
transit pipelines towards its own domestic industries and households (Pleines 2008). 
47
 As with the gas crisis of 2006, the gas crisis of 2009 was a prolongation of disputes regarding contractual obligations, 
gas prices and transit fees.  
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security of supply could be ensured by the Member States on their own or by the energy industry 
came under pressure. The challenge of ensuring the necessary amount of energy in a situation, 
where European energy resources were declining, called for new responses. The agenda for the 
European energy policy was once again widened with a stronger emphasis on coalescing the two 
main trends of the past two decades, securitisation and liberalisation. The response, seen from our 
perspective, is an inclusive approach seeking to combine security of supply with principles of 
diversification and solidarity. While diversification can be seen in line with the idea of ensuring 
security of supply, the principle of solidarity is perhaps more alien to a European energy policy 
dimension. In the following chapter, we analyse in depth how the three principles can be seen as a 
response to the two concurrent trends of securitisation and liberalisation. We therefore also 
scrutinise how the principles are embodied in concrete policy responses to the development of 
energy in the new millennium.   
4.2 The Principles of Security of Supply, Diversification and Solidarity: 
Importance and Interplay with European Energy Policy 
In the previous section, we identified securitisation and liberalisation as the two main trends 
underlying the development of the European energy policy. Along the lines of these trends, we see 
three principles - security of supply, diversification and solidarity - as the functional response to 
an EU energy policy based on a conjunction of securitisation and liberalisation. What we find is 
that these specific principles, which were formerly mainly regarded as national concepts, are 
increasingly incorporated into European energy policy.   
In this section, we analyse how these principles are constituted within European energy policy 
against a backdrop of the two trends; how they are perceived by energy stakeholders, and whether 
they gain increasing importance through concrete EU policy measures. 
4.2.1 Securitisation and Liberalisation  a Successful Blend? 
Even though securitisation and liberalisation have been the two predominant trends since the early 
1990 s, there does not seem to have been agreement on how to coalesce the trends into concrete 
policy. The development of the European energy policy from the First Liberalisation Package of 
1998 to the Third Liberalisation Package of 2009 has however shown an increased emphasis on 
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strengthening the regulatory framework. Thus, even though a liberalisation agenda has been seen as 
the way forward, especially from the Commission, in order to engage the Member States in a 
process towards more liberalised markets, the tendency has actually pointed towards increased 
regulation, hence creating positive integration. Moreover, this dichotomy follows the theoretical 
argument of regulatory governance that regulation is expanding due to functional interdependence 
deriving from the need to ensure that liberalisation is carried through. Within the European energy 
policy, what has followed from the liberalisation agenda is a need for more specific regulation - 
partly in order to create a more well-functioning market, and partly to cope with issues relating to 
security of supply. This regulatory development has taken further shape in order to correct 
perceived market failures. Two primary reasons for the market failures are, according to the 
Commission (2006), the lack of unbundling of transport system ownership from production in the 
Member States48 and lacking interconnectedness of the markets. Much of the resistance to further 
liberalisation can essentially be traced back to the difference between the integrative steps taken to 
ensure liberalisation, and the protective steps taken by the often state-owned energy industry and 
the respective Member States to ensure that security concerns are observed49.  
Thus, the classical dilemma of European integration with institutional endeavours to liberalise and 
Member State efforts to retain sovereignty is also reproduced within the energy policy, and perhaps 
even more prominently than in other policy areas due to the omnipotent and securitised character of 
energy (Eikeland 2008).  
In order to understand the development of the European energy policy, we will in the following 
analyse the trends functional expression through the principles of security of supply, diversification 
and solidarity.  
4.2.2 Security of Supply as a Response to Securitisation and Liberalisation? 
As discussed in section 4.1, security of supply has gained prominence within the energy policy as it 
essentially encapsulates the whole energy debate will there be enough energy? This concern has 
                                                
48 The Third Liberalisation Package includes a provision for ownership unbundling, which requires Member States to 
fully divest the transmission networks from the vertically integrated gas industry (Council of the European Union 2009 
a). Thus, the TSOs, as independent entities, should own the network infrastructure in the individual Member States. 
Prior to the Third Liberalisation Package, the 2003 Energy Directive only obliged the Member States to 
organisationally separate production from network activity (so-called legal separation ), while not forcing the Member 
States to sell off their network business (Eikeland 2008: 1).  
49 An example of this is how France and Germany opposed the increasing unbundling requirements incrementally 
introduced with the three energy packages (Eikeland 2008).   
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become increasingly relevant due to the depleting European gas resources and recurrent gas crises, 
which have induced pessimism regarding the future security of supply. Some observers even 
proceed from this pessimism to see the future energy policy within a dramaturgy of war and peace 
(e.g. Baran 2007; Whist 2009). Consequently, when energy policy is framed this pessimistically, 
the legitimisation of stronger EU coordination of domestic security of supply could prove difficult, 
as each Member State accordingly seeks to secure its own national supplies. But as a result of the 
liberalisation process and the increasing scope of the EU s energy policy, the principle of security 
of supply is elevated to the European level. As argued in section 4.1, the Commission has especially 
sought to claim that national security of supply can only be enhanced through market liberalisation. 
Thereby, the Commission has used the principle of security of supply to obtain agreement on the 
disputed liberalisation agenda (European Commission 2000; I9 2010; I5 2010).   
The principle of security of supply has developed into becoming the pervading principle and driver 
for a European dimension of energy (I5 2010; I9 2010). Theoretically, the principle s paramount 
role should be seen in relation to the liberalisation efforts, since security of supply with the growing 
interconnectedness of the markets is increasingly becoming a trans-European problem. Thus, the 
theoretical notion by Keohane (1984) of situational interdependence is relevant, when discussing 
the problems of security of supply in order to understand a shift of allegiance from the national to 
the European level. Thus, as discussed in section 4.1, the gas crises of 2006 and 2009 exposed the 
vulnerability of national security of supply, when each state along the pipeline siphoned gas to 
ensure their own supply (Kefferpütz 2009; I10 2010). The negative externalities of these state-
centric practices of securing own national supply induced a further need for institutionalising a 
mechanism for security of supply at the European level.  
Despite the theoretical argument of the need for further institutionalisation of European security of 
supply, interviews with energy stakeholders reveal that little agreement has been reached on the 
definition of the principle of security of supply. A Danish energy expert (I9 2010:A3) for instance 
states: some say that security of supply is a question of physical disruption, others say that high 
prices can be considered a breach of security of supply . Others again simply put emphasis on gas 
quantity as the most important criterion to enhance the security of supply. The Head of Nord Stream 
EU Representation, Sebastian Sass (2010: A4), argues that security of supply is about: having 
enough volume on the market . Taking into consideration Nord Stream s role of providing gas to 
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the European market, Sass definition might not come as a surprise, but it however reveals certain 
interesting aspects. Hence, transport capacity seems crucial to enhance the security of supply in 
Europe. As an example, a Danish energy representative argues that the problem during the 2009 gas 
crisis - despite the public debate - was not a lack of gas, but of transport capacity (I10 2010). Thus, 
the lack of transport capacity prevented the gas from being distributed from gas centres , such as 
the Netherlands, to those Member States experiencing supply interruptions.  
The crisis and the differing understandings of security of supply led to an increased emphasis on the 
need for further internal liberalisation of the market and stronger pipeline interconnection (de Jong 
2008). Therefore, despite the increased securitisation of energy in the aftermath of the crisis, the 
response actually seemed conducing to the European liberalisation agenda.  
Some argue that security of supply is the functional common denominator of the two trends. As a 
German energy expert (2010: A2) argues: a more liberalised market is the best way to offer 
consumers good prices and security of supply . On the other hand, a Danish TSO representative 
asserts that the ambition of security of supply is not necessarily consistent with the liberalisation 
trend if liberalisation is to be understood as cheap energy through market integration. Thus, 
according to the Danish TSO representative (2010: A38), You cannot, with short-term contracts 
and 100 percent cut-throat competition, and with no profits, expect anybody to invest in security of 
supply . This point was however already recognised by the Commission (cf. Eikeland 2004: 28) in 
a 2000 Green Paper, At first sight, the aims of energy supply security are not always fully 
compatible with those of competitiveness ( ) and liberalisation . Moreover, given that the demand 
for energy is set to rise in the years to come, it can be argued that full-fledged market liberalisation 
and upholding the principle of security of supply could appear to be a contradiction in terms.   
The contradiction between liberalisation and securitisation in relation to the principle of security of 
supply is exemplified in the so-called Public Service Obligation (PSO) of the Member States, 
which is included in all three liberalisation packages. The obligation allows Member States to 
deviate from the Internal Market principles, if they find it necessary on the basis of national security 
of supply considerations (Eikeland 2004; Council of the European Union 1998: (12); Council of the 
European Union 2003: Art. 3; Council of the European Union 2009a: Art. 3). The consequences of 
the PSO were clearly proven during the 2009 gas crisis. The crisis showed that some Member States 
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opted for national security of supply considerations, which implied problems for other Member 
States. As noted in the Commission s assessment report (2009a: 11) on the European response to 
the crisis, one of the obstacles was that differing understanding of public service obligations 
across Member States made it difficult to ensure a common response to the crisis. Hence, the 
diverging national policies and security concerns of security of supply proved to be a problem for 
the efforts to forge consensus on a European approach to security of supply.  
This problematic however seems to correspond with a concurrent lack of trust in the institutional 
setup at the EU-level. As Keohane (1984) would posit, principles might not be dependable enough 
to ensure policy support. The problems of defection and cheating from a too loosely formulated 
principle, have however been sought countered by the Commission through an institutionalisation 
of the principle of security of supply as a policy of shared purposes. In this sense, one could argue 
that the strategy of the Commission is in line with the argument by Keohane (1984) that an 
institutionalisation of a specific policy can facilitate consistency with principles. There has been 
considerable Member State support for providing stronger regulation to ensure the coherence of 
national security of supply strategies, although Member States were opposing any considerable 
transfer of competences to the supranational level (Noël 2010).   
Beyond Principles: Institutionalising Security of Supply 
The increased integration of energy policy within the EU has likewise created a need to 
institutionalise the principle of security of supply with some legislative competences to the EU. As 
Ahner et al. (2010: 19f) states, the development has gone from a collection of general per 
definitionem non-energy provisions, such as those on the internal market (ex-Article 95 EC), on 
competition (ex-Article 81-88 EC) or on trans-European networks (ex-Art 154 EC) to a finally 
explicit provision ( ) which invites the EU explicitly to establish those measures necessary to 
achieve security of supply . The institutionalisation of the principle of security of supply is 
therefore the result of a gradual development. A Directive on Security of Supply was thus adopted 
already in 2004 (Council of European Union 2004). It however proved not to be precise enough, 
since it gave Member States too much liberty to decide on the choice of methods to respond to a 
crisis (Ahner et al. 2010). This point is supported by the ENTSOG representative (I1 2010: A4), 
who critically states: back in 2004, the European institutions adopted the Security of Supply 
Directive and there you could see that the right of initiative is not enough, because the Commission 
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was very ambitious at that time, and the Council stripped the legal proposal of any significant 
provision, so in the end it was kind of a more or less toothless instrument . Thus, a stronger 
regulatory framework seemed vital not least to the European-level bureaucrats in charge of much 
of the day-to-day management of EU energy policy.  
In 2009, the then Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs (European Commission 2009c) stated 
regarding the need for a Regulation on Security of Supply: We have known for some time that the 
existing arrangements to deal with gas emergencies are insufficient. The Russia-Ukraine gas 
dispute in January 2009 confirmed our fears. All Member States recognise that we need common 
standards for security of gas supply for the whole EU". The crisis had epitomised what had been the 
argument of the Commission for years: There was a need for stronger energy market regulation to 
strengthen the European response in case of supply cuts. Hence, given a window of opportunity, 
the focus of the Commission in the aftermath of the crisis was to ensure an institutionalisation of 
concrete policies for short-term supply security. Thus, in order to compensate for the lack of 
agreement on the definition on the security of supply among Member States, the European 
Commission proposed as part of a Regulation on Security of Supply a rather technical mechanism 
(the so-called N-1 formula) to define, when there is a breach of security of supply within the EU. 
The Council subsequently adopted the proposal in October 2010 (Council of the European Union 
2010). The Regulation on Security of Supply specifically took into account the concerns immanent 
in both the liberalisation and securitisation trend (Ahner et al. 2010). Thus, the 2010 Regulation 
essentially aims at providing high-quality information to prevent defection from the principle of 
trans-European energy solidarity as stipulated in art. 1 (Council of the European Union 2010). The 
2010 Regulation therefore aims at strengthening Member State commitment and making it more 
difficult for Member States to defect from common European action in case of future gas crises. 
The 2010 Regulation clearly highlights the problem of institutionalising security of supply at the 
European level and the duality of the two trends: Where the security of supply of a Member State 
is threatened, there is a clear risk that measures developed unilaterally ( ) may jeopardise the 
proper functioning of the internal gas market  (Council of the European Union 2010: (5)). Contrary 
to the 2004 Directive on Security of Supply, the 2010 Regulation (Council of the European Union 
2010: (13) includes the N-1 formula to define the failure of the single largest gas infrastructure , 
as a basis to analyse the security of supply of each Member State. This all sounds like progress, but 
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as the ENTSOG representative50 (I1 2010: A10) argues the indicator [N-1 formula] says nothing 
about the security of supply situation, because you could find countries with a positive indicator, 
which actually suffered during the Russian crisis . The Regulation does most importantly 
contrary to the Directive of 200451 - specify that the security of supply of gas is a shared 
responsibility between gas suppliers, Member States (notably represented by the TSOs and NRAs) 
and the Commission (Council of the European Union 2010: Art. 3). Despite the critique from the 
ENTSOG representative, the 2010 Regulation nevertheless shows the continuous efforts to find 
common ground on security of supply (I1 2010). But what perhaps constitutes a general problem 
within energy policy is the proclivity of precedence of state interests, which entails challenges when 
seeking to implement the principles (Ahner et al. 2010: 21). As the ENTSOG representative (I1 
2010: A9) also states, you start understanding how different views are behind these high-level 
ideas that were presented. So people that were actually saying the same thing before are all of a 
sudden saying different things, because now they are implementing [the Regulation] .   
Despite the problems of implementing the 2010 Regulation, the institutionalisation of a security of 
supply regulation with its technical provisions is interesting. Thus, in spite of the highly securitised 
profile of security of supply, the 2010 Regulation to some extent brings the management of EU 
energy policy down to a bureaucratic-technocratic level, which involves new regulatory actors 
engaged in EU-level cooperation. A crucial point is however that the Member States, despite the 
repeated linkage between liberalisation and stronger EU-institutionalisation, have effectively 
secured the competence to manage their own energy mix. This is relevant as the 2010 Regulation 
does not aim at giving the EU any competences in upholding adequate supplies of energy, for 
instance through storage facilities, but instead leaves this to the market players and Member States 
(Ahner et al. 2010: 20). What the 2010 Regulation does imply is greater transparency, which 
accordingly makes room for better trans-European cooperation in case of a crisis. This tendency in 
line with Keohane s (1984) argument that the greater transparency obtained through the 
institutionalisation increases the facilitation of policies with mutual gains, and in our view perhaps 
changes the Member States calculations towards a more pro-European stance. Thus, even though 
                                                
50 The statements of the ENTSOG representative are especially interesting since ENTSOG representing the European 
TSOs are expected to be the day-to-day managers of information exchange regarding storage levels, reverse flow 
opportunities, while providing advice to the Commission (Council of the European Union 2009c). 
51 The 2004 directive instead states that security of supply is the responsibility of the different market players 
(Council of the European Union  2004: art. 3). 
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security of supply for a long time was considered a national rather than European priority, the 
introduction of this 2010 Regulation could essentially alter the Member States behavioural pattern 
of assuring their own supply. Therefore, Member States should integrate the negative externalities 
for other Member States in their calculation. As the 2010 Regulation gets enacted into the wider 
framework of EU energy policy, any aberrant behaviour might have consequences when negotiating 
other deals within the EU-framework, since issue-linkage becomes possible. Since the past gas 
crises will probably not be the last, the 2010 Regulation provides for a more European approach to 
future crises; hence, Member States increasingly have to exchange short-term benefits - such as 
siphoning gas for own use - for the long-term benefits of living up to the agreed measures of the 
2010 Regulation.   
The fact that an institutionalisation of security of supply is taking place through the 2010 
Regulation can be seen as a way for Member States to compensate for the liberalisation trend. Thus, 
as national energy monopolies are incrementally weakened as a result of the three liberalisation 
packages, Member States might see EU-level regulation as the only viable way to continue to steer 
the policy process and be able to effectively sanction market failures in other Member States.   
The 2010 Regulation mainly comes into play in case of a short-term supply crisis. The broader 
aspects of security of supply do however also infer a focus on the need to ensure supply security in 
the long term. In this connection, the principle of diversification becomes essential as Member 
States seek out ways to ensure adequate supplies of energy. 
4.2.3 Diversification  New Routes Ahead? 
We have until now identified security of supply as the main response to the two concurrent trends 
of securitisation and liberalisation. Hirschausen & Holz (2008) specifically argue that the short-term 
security of supply requires a certain interventionist approach , while long-term security of supply, 
primarily through diversification, is foremost the responsibility of industry, and in principle, 
governments should not interfere . The argument of Hirschhausen & Holz is interesting in the 
context of the European energy policy, since the idea that governments should not interfere in 
commercial efforts to diversify routes and suppliers does not seem to correspond with the political 
realities. Diversification does in essence require cross-border cooperation in order to reach 
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agreement on interconnectors and new pipelines. Diversification therefore ultimately becomes 
political, as Keohane (1984) would propound, due to the fact that diversification has the prospect of 
changing the national energy champions dominion or/and have negative externalities for 
bystanders to an agreement. The aforementioned unbundling process, which is clearly in line with 
the liberalisation agenda, thus seeks to create internal diversification by opening up the market for 
new suppliers. Unbundling has been mentioned as one of the most contentious issues, not least due 
to the fact that it is the most far-reaching example of internal energy diversification. It has therefore 
also encountered strong opposition from especially France and Germany, since these Member 
States have had strict state-controlled energy champions (Eikeland 2008). However despite this 
opposition, the three liberalisation packages mark a clear shift towards more strictly defined EU 
regulation on unbundling (Eikeland 2008). One of the main reasons for Member States critical 
standpoint towards unbundling is the top-down nature of this requirement, which does not leave 
much manoeuvre room for Member State on how to implement the unbundling requirement in 
practice, due to the rather strict definition of the requirement laid down in the Third Liberalisation 
Package (I6 2010; I3 2010; Groenendijk 2009). The unbundling requirements thus, from the outset, 
seem to be in line with the liberalisation efforts of diversifying the markets, while not taking into 
consideration the securitisation trend. This legitimisation of unbundling through the liberalisation 
trend might however prove to be complicated, as the unbundling exercise becomes increasingly 
important in connection to upstream third country suppliers. Third country suppliers are often 
highly informed by the securitisation trend, which is why the unbundling approach of the EU might 
be naive in the wider perspective of energy policy (Riley 2006). Thus as argued by France (Loos 
2007), the unbundling exercise might actually weaken the bargaining power of the Member States 
towards third country suppliers.     
The External Diversification  Faced with Clashing Interests 
Clearly, diversification has high priority for most European states, not least due to the close 
interconnectedness of diversification with long-term strategies of security of supply. Namely the 
external dimension of diversification encounters security considerations, when Member States seek 
out new third country suppliers of gas. Thus, the diversification of gas is often intertwined with 
other areas of Member States foreign policy. 
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As with the principle of security of supply, there is substantial variation among stakeholders 
regarding what constitutes diversification. For instance, the Lithuanian energy representative (2010: 
A5) clearly states that The description of security of supply, for us, is diversification of sources 
and suppliers. Both, only both, are important. That s why we are quite keen on building an LNG 
[Liquefied Natural Gas] terminal in Lithuania, because that could help us to have an external 
supply. Now we only have the pipe to Belarus. It s not even an EU Member State and ( ) you can 
very easily have political cases with the non-Member States of the European Union. Just conflict 
with Russia and Belarus, and we are without gas (own accentuation). The quote exemplifies that 
the idea that diversification should not be subject to government intervention is hardly consistent 
with the European strategy for diversification - a strategy, which for instance is expressed through a 
number of policies to ensure diversification, such as the TEN-E programme52. Thus, the challenge 
of diversification has a decidedly political undertone, as most pipeline projects are agreed 
intergovernmental, not least those pipelines which involve third country suppliers, such as Russia. 
The German energy representative (I3 2010: A9) further underlines the point of diversification 
being political, by stating that the Member States have to care for their security of supply by 
making the necessary investments . The German (I3 2010: A17) representative agrees with the 
Lithuanian representative on the need for diversifying routes and sources, but emphasises that the 
sources must be reliable , while for instance seeing the mutual interdependence between the EU 
and Russia as a reason for perceiving Russia as a reliable partner53.  
Contrary to the German energy representative, Estonian (Bult 2010), Lithuanian (I7 2010) and 
Polish (I6 2010) energy representatives emphasise the importance of diversification of suppliers, 
thereby targeting the problem of their dependency on Russia. The Nord Stream representative 
Sebastian Sass (2010: A5) however argues, when faced with the criticism that Nord Stream is not 
consistent with the goal of diversification: to my understanding, the source really means the 
source and not source country . This difference in the understanding of diversification necessarily 
needs to be seen, as Keohane (1984) argues, in context with the structural milieu of the Member 
States; hence the gas supply situation as well as the historical relations with Russia are different for 
these Member States. While both the Lithuanian (I7 2010) and the Polish (I6 2010) representative 
                                                
52
 We shall investigate further the nature of the TEN-E programme in section 4.2.3. 
53 As he (I3 2010: A16) argues, you have to keep in mind that the relations between Russia and Europe both are 
dependent on each other. In Europe, countries are buying gas and Russia needs the money. So it s a bargain for both, 
and not only for one side . 
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raise the question of the reliability of having only one source, the German representative (I3 2010) 
does not see a need for looking elsewhere for suppliers. As he (I3 2010: A16) argues, you don t 
have a similar choice as when buying a car, where you have the choice between 500 different 
models. When you want to buy gas from a producer, you can choose between gas from five 
producers. So it s limited by nature that you buy gas from the country being able to sell it . The 
fact that Lithuania and Poland, in opposition to Germany, stress diversification of suppliers as an 
important factor should, according to Keohane (1984), be understood in the context of the different 
opportunity costs of diversifying suppliers. Germany does - due to is previously mentioned market 
size and share in Nord Stream - not consider suppliers as a vital part of diversification. If we take 
into account that diversification has preponderantly been a responsibility of the Member States, it 
does not come as a surprise that Poland and Lithuania, comparatively small energy states, perceive 
a stronger need for an institutional role for the EU in order to facilitate, in the words of Keohane 
(1984: 88), mutually beneficial agreements that would otherwise be difficult or impossible to 
attain . The possible exclusionary effect of Member States unilateral diversification strategies thus 
provides ample reason for understanding why Poland and Lithuania regard a more coordinated 
external policy as essential.   
While the above shows a broad variation in Member States perceptions of diversification, it also 
reveals an interesting dichotomy when seeking to understand the efforts of diversification in the 
context of the two preponderant trends within European energy policy: Although diversification in 
many ways - not least judicially through the three liberalisation packages - is the responsibility of 
the individual Member States, the functioning of the internal energy market (wherein the EU has 
competences) essentially rests on the need for securing adequate supplies, not least in times of 
crisis. Thus, whereas diversification can be understood in a narrow, state-centric perspective with a 
strong link to national security of supply, the Commission has sought to institutionalise 
diversification at the European level and thus promote market solutions to the problem of lack of 
diversification.      
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Institutionalising Diversification: Trans-European Networks for Energy Programme  
A concrete example of the institutionalisation of diversification at the EU-level is the Trans-
European Networks for Energy Programme (TEN-E), which is part of the Commission s strategy to 
promote liberalisation through diversification (Council of the European Union 2006; I8 2010).  
The TEN-E programme54 was developed in 1996 as part of EU initiatives to complete the internal 
market for energy and with the purpose of providing a more European political impulse  to energy 
infrastructure investment (European Commission 2010a: 1; I8 2010). With the introduction of the 
TEN-E, policy on gas infrastructure shifts from being solely a national or bilateral concern to also 
becoming an overall European concern. In this sense, the TEN-E programme seems to adhere to the 
liberalisation trend and the Commission s wish to add a European element to the promotion of 
diversification (European Commission 2010a). 
In addition, an element of political legitimisation is connected to diversification through the way 
projects to be granted a TEN-E status is decided upon. TEN-E projects are selected within the 
framework of the Regulatory Procedure (Council of the European Union: art. 14): Whereas the 
Commission suggests which pipeline projects to be granted a TEN-E status, a Committee with 
Member State representatives shall deliver an opinion (based on majority voting) on the proposal 
from the Commission (Council of the European Union 1999: art. 6).  
The linking of the TEN-E programme to EU energy policy priorities and principles makes the 
programme important in relation to the liberalisation trend. While keeping in mind the relatively 
small budget of the TEN-E programme ( 150 million in 2010), it does however appear to have 
some institutional impact (I8 2010). Thus, the institutionalisation of diversification through the 
TEN-E programme creates increased impetus for interconnecting the European gas grid. Taking 
into consideration earlier Member State attempts to safeguard national monopolies, thereby 
retaining market control, the TEN-E programme s institutional impact could be that it renders such 
protectionist practices increasingly difficult to sustain. The TEN-E concurrently also reflects a 
general trend towards framing infrastructure as a security concern. Thus, there is a now a security 
of supply criterion, which projects have to live up to, in order to be eligible for the TEN-E status, 
and the Commission seeks to streamline the TEN-E with the Energy chapter of the Treaty 
(European Commission 2010a; European Commission 2010b).  
                                                
54 The TEN-E programme provides financial support, mainly for feasibility studies regarding the construction of gas 
pipelines, and thus serves an overall purpose of strengthening and interconnecting the European gas grid. 
 64
The above suggests that although the success of TEN-E in practice might have been limited, the 
Commission has aimed at creating a European framework for tackling problems relating to 
diversification. Theoretically, it can be argued that by instigating a common EU framework for 
promoting diversification, the Commission aims at balancing the internal concerns of securitisation 
vis-à-vis liberalisation. Hence, supporting infrastructure projects is regarded as a route to strengthen 
internal cohesion, while concurrently strengthening the European security of supply by supporting 
new gas routes and interconnections within the market.  
Furthermore, the European framework for diversification also has an important external dimension 
attached to it. According to the apparent logic of the Commission, if the liberalisation efforts are to 
be successful, much rests upon having sufficient internal gas infrastructure and securing stronger 
EU coordination in relation to external suppliers (Commission 2008). This conclusion was also 
reached in an independent peer review of the functioning of the internal market, wherein it is 
stated that ensuring an adequate level of coordinated investments for cross-border gas transport 
and the connection between regional gas hubs may require a super-regional Top-down approach, 
as well as the involvement of European and national political authorities (Everis & Mercados 
2010: 73). These ambitions of enhancing the EU's position vis-à-vis external suppliers can be 
grasped from a neoliberal institutionalist perspective. As argued by Keohane (1984), the need for 
counterbalancing negative externalities is often a reason to strengthen institutional cooperation. In 
relation hereto, investments in infrastructure to complete the European gas grid, coordinating 
tariffication systems and opening up for reverse flow in pipelines can be regarded as actions to 
strengthen the EU's position vis-à-vis external suppliers. In other words, the stronger the internal 
coherence, the stronger the EU position towards third country suppliers.  
In order to strengthen this internal coherence, solidarity is, as we shall see in the following, 
increasingly sought institutionalised at the European level, as a way to commit Member States to 
the principles of security of supply and diversification.  
4.2.4 Energy Policy Solidarity: Speaking with One Voice ? 
One of the most critical questions when discussing international relations is perhaps the question of 
how to ensure solidarity across national borders. Many observers have argued that the problem of 
the European energy policy is that nested national interests do not allow for a common European 
approach or regulatory framework which, quoting the Lisbon Treaty (Art. 194), should be based on 
 65
a spirit of solidarity 55 (European Union 2008; Koczij 2010; Umbach 2009). The two identified 
trends of securitisation and liberalisation clearly reflect this problem, which concurrently also 
exposes the weaknesses of the current development of the EU s energy policy. Thus, while security 
of supply and diversification have been provided with a functional response through different 
policies, solidarity features as part of a more difficult and value-laden debate.   
From the outset, the securitisation trend seems to have given rise to increased state-centric 
practices, not least regarding securing supplies from external sources. These practices to some 
extent undermine the attempts to establish trans-European energy solidarity. While the liberalisation 
trend has provided fertile ground for inducing market-based solidarity internally in the EU, the big 
discussion of a lack of solidarity - commonly framed as the need for a one-voice-model - is more 
pertinent in relation to external suppliers. The one-voice-model is at the same time contentious, as 
Member States seek to retain control of their external relations. The Commission (2008: 10) also 
recognised this dilemma in its Action Plan for energy security and solidarity from 2008: Speaking 
with one voice does not mean a single Community representative for external issues, but effective 
planning and coordination to ensure a commonality of both action and message at Community and 
Member State level . Despite this apparent institutional respect for national competences, the EU - 
spearheaded by the Commission - is increasingly seeking to develop its external governance. As the 
Slovak energy representative (I5 2010: A5) argues, when we take a look at the common planning 
and so on, this already got some kind of solidarity, because you are not only taking a look at 
yourself, at your market, at your customers ( ) So this could already be solidarity near practice . 
The representative (I5 2010: A5) however also admits that the Member States view this concept [of 
solidarity] somewhat differently ( ) It also depends on the geographical location, diversification 
possibilities and so on . In a neoliberal institutionalist perspective, a main obstacle seems to be the 
substantially different opportunity costs for the Member States with regard to transferring further 
competences to the EU. This is a problem, which is also recognised by Röller et al. (2007: 22), who 
state that large countries, or countries with relatively low foreign dependence (for example, 
France or Germany), might not derive significant benefits from giving a European dimension to 
                                                
55 A quite illustrious example hereof was the intricate negotiations on the Polish proposal for a new Energy Treaty, 
which was based on a clearly and firmly stated guarantee clause based on the musketeer principle: all for one one 
for all . (Marcinkiewicz 2006:3). The treaty proposal was firmly rejected by a number of EU Member States (Taylor 
2006; Maltby 2010). 
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their external policy . This also points to a very characteristic problem of institutionalising 
solidarity within an area such as the energy policy. Thus, as Keohane (1984) infers, the largest 
states are essentially shaping the extent of the institutionalisation process after what they perceive to 
be the optimal level of cooperation. The idea that solidarity should suddenly appear within 
European energy policy seems overly optimistic. Thus, the securitisation of European energy 
policy, as sought illustrated by Radoman (2007), does not give way for much inter-state solidarity. 
If the agenda is securitised, mutual dependency on energy does not lend much hope to a solidary 
approach, if the Member States renounce rational and responsible efforts to enhance the common 
energy security by instead focusing on narrow national security strategies (Radoman 2007: 44). 
Instigating solidarity beyond a normative principle therefore seems vital, as there, in the words of 
Delors et al. (2010: 72) is no point in pursuing European integration if some members are literally 
leaving others out in the cold . This point resembles the theoretical argument of Keohane (1984) 
that institutionalised cooperation occasionally possesses exclusionary characteristics, which 
however in terms of the European energy policy is increasingly sought counterpoised. As Delors et 
al. (2010: 82) also point out in their recommendation to the future European energy policy: no 
added value can come from competition between member states vis-à-vis producer and transit 
countries. The European Union ( ) must therefore ensure that solidarity can function and that no 
third country can reduce supply in a targeted manner. Solidarity, instead of competing claims of 
national sovereignty, should be the guide in developing a European energy policy . 
The EU does not hold particular competences within external energy relations, which could ensure 
a more unified stance and implicitly stronger trans-European solidarity. However through the 
institutionalisation and gradually expanding regulatory framework of the internal energy market, 
the lack of external EU energy competences are sought countered (Delors et al. 2010; Renner 
2009).   
Solidarity through the Internal Energy Market? 
The liberalisation process and the institutionalisation of EU energy policy create a demand for 
looking beyond mere national priorities within the internal energy market. As the Danish TSO 
representative (I2 2010: A22) argues, it is no longer enough that we secure our own supply, we 
also need to hand over what we can to our neighbouring countries ( ) which implies that we from 
the Danish side have to cover the Swedish emergency supply-system. They don t have the tools, so 
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we have to do it . A slight shift therefore seems to have happened in the maelstrom of the 
liberalisation trend. Thus, solidarity no longer remains a question only to be dealt with only at the 
national level, since new regulatory actors such as the TSOs and NRAs are engaged in the day-to-
day management of the energy policy. Despite this new role for regulatory actors, The German 
energy representative (I3 2010: A9) interestingly argues that the discussion on energy solidarity is 
at a political level , not least due to the fact that decision-making power is still firmly nested at the 
intergovernmental level (Delors et al. 2010). If solidarity is to mean anything in the context of the 
EU s energy policy, it is vital to move it beyond a normative discussion. This however also seems 
to be the strategy of the Commission, as the Commission increasingly provides issue-linkage 
between the liberalisation of the market and the need for trans-European solidarity. As the 
Commission argues, While each Member State is responsible for its own security, solidarity 
between Member States is a basic feature of EU membership. With the internal market for energy, 
specific national solutions are often insufficient (Commission 2008: 4). Though there appears to be 
nominal agreement to this Commission argument among the Member States, the problem arises in 
the implementation phase. As the Slovak energy representative (I5 2010: A4) states everybody is 
full of solidarity in their speeches, but then when it comes to the mechanisms for that it s always 
nice to help, but when we take a look at the crisis [of 2009] as it was, of course the gas was flowing, 
but you should also take a look at the prices, at which this was happening .  
The institutionalisation of solidarity as a principle overlying the European energy policy, therefore 
also seems to target the problems of energy policy namely that each state traditionally within 
energy policy has sought to be master of its own fate. 
Therefore, when considering solidarity, an interesting duality appears in the intersection between 
full-fledged liberalisation and securitisation. On the one hand, the principle of solidarity is 
internally in the EU shaped by liberalisation, which entails profit-maximisation and opportunity 
cost-considerations a market-based solidarity. On the other hand the external dimension of 
solidarity, understood as a common approach to third-country suppliers, seems guided by the 
security concerns of the Member States.   
The analysed development of the EU energy policy has shown that this policy area has obtained an 
increasing complexity, moving it beyond the traditional discussions on the Member States versus 
the Commission. Thus, the complexity of the analysed European energy policy does however also 
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imply that is should be perceived as multidimensional. Despite little public attention hereof, much 
of the day-to-day management of the EU energy policy seems to have been put in the hands of 
regulatory actors in between levels . 
4.3 Regulatory Networks within European Energy Policy 
In this section, we discuss the emergence of a new level of regulatory governance within European 
energy policy56. While section 4.1 and 4.2 was preponderantly directed by a state-centric and 
intergovernmental perspective on the development of European energy policy, we now move on to 
analyse the regulatory governance process beyond delegation towards a new level of EU-
cooperation. Cooperation within European energy policy is increasingly steered by new regulatory 
actors (TSOs and NRAs) through European regulatory networks (ENTSOG and ACER) engaged in 
cooperation at the EU-level. Therefore, we proceed from the previous sections focus on policy 
development to focus on the instigation of new actors in the maelstrom of the liberalisation and 
securitisation trends.  
In the following, we analyse the role of these regulatory actors, and the governance network in 
which they operate. Furthermore, we discuss the interplay between the regulatory actors vis-à-vis 
the European Commission and the Member States in order to analyse whether horizontal 
delegation of competences to regulatory actors imposes a shift in the overall day-to-day 
management of the European energy policy. We see these new regulatory actors as a new part of 
the overall regulatory governance of the EU energy policy preponderantly consisting of the 
Member States and the Commission. The day-to-day management of the energy policy is 
furthermore interesting in relation to the two trends of liberalisation and securitisation, wherefore 
we also emphasise how the regulatory actors seek to integrate the concerns connected with each of 
these trends in their daily work.  
4.3.1 A New Governance Dimension in European Energy Policy  
The development of the European energy policy has created a need for more cooperation and 
coordination at the European level, while it has exposed the delimitations of a purely 
intergovernmental setup. We now turn to analyse the emergence and consequences of the 
                                                
56 This section is primarily analysed within the perspective of the theoretical framework of regulatory governance (see 
section 3.2). 
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introduction of a new level of governance within European energy policy. More specifically, it is 
governance in the sense that the process is multi-level, involving actors stemming from both the 
national and the European levels. The technical regulations that are the cynosure of the new 
governance cannot be delimitated from the intergovernmental policy process and accordingly might 
inherit political consequences. With the incremental liberalisation of the European energy market, 
the issues up for regulation , such as tariff transparency and infrastructure-projects, have cross-
border characteristics (I10 2010).   
The regulatory actors (TSOs and NRAs) from the outset play an important role in strengthening the 
regulatory framework for the European energy policy, while they still aim to preserve the division 
of competences between the Member States and the European Commission (Eberlein 2010). In 
short, Member States have been required to designate specific national authorities to deal with 
regulatory affairs, thereby horizontally outsourcing these activities from a pure Member State 
level to a level beyond delegation 57 (I2 2010).   
What we see as a capability gap provides a basis for explaining this outsourcing of regulatory 
activities: The liberalisation of the energy market, encouraged by the European Commission, has 
increasingly entailed a need for European regulatory cooperation to likewise handle the market (I2 
2010; I9 2010; I5 2010; I1 2010; Hancher & de Hautecloque 2010). At the same time, however, the 
EU has not been assigned new formal competences to carry out the liberalisation process. 
Therefore, horizontal delegation within European energy policy could be seen as a new way to 
break the institutional dilemma: Dealing with regulatory problems of trans-European character 
without a transfer of Member State competences to the EU. In a theoretical perspective, it is 
relevant to point to the multi-level nature of energy policy resulting from the liberalisation process. 
Arguably, there is a capability gap due to this lack of institutional instruments at the European 
level to carry out the liberalisation process in practice. Thus, the involvement of new actors 
formalised in European regulatory networks (ENTSOG and ACER) can be seen as a way to solve 
the capability gap , whilst, at least nominally, respecting the formal national sovereignty of the 
Member States.  
                                                
57 The term beyond delegation is also applied by Eberlein and Newman (2005) and refers to a level of cooperation in 
between the Member State and the European Commission. While the new actors are tied to the national level in the 
sense that they are designated by the Member States, they act with a certain amount of independency from the Member 
States. 
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Furthermore, enforcing a stronger regulatory dimension within European energy policy seems to be 
in line with the arguments of Majone (1994) concerning the concept of the regulatory state of the 
EU; the enhanced cooperation through regulatory networks composed by national experts could be 
seen as a functional way to solve the problems associated with the liberalisation of the energy 
market.  
Following Majone s (1994) reasoning, Member States could see the establishment of regulatory 
networks as a tolerable solution to fulfil the agreed EU-objective of creating a better functioning 
internal energy market, while balancing competences between the Member States and the EU. In 
this perspective, regulatory networks composed by nationally designated authorities could seem to 
provide for a politically feasible approach, since experts involved in these European networks are 
primarily designated due to their technical expertise. The setup of the regulatory networks within 
European energy policy does however not always allow regulatory experts to act non-politically. 
Therefore, this setup perhaps challenges the idea that the horizontal transfer of competences is a 
smooth way of upholding a clear division between Member State vis-à-vis EU competences. The 
specific physical nature of energy, which requires highly advanced technical regulations, together 
with the fact that the regulatory networks ultimately have to harmonise Member State energy 
regulations seems to make it almost impossible for these networks to avoid some degree of 
politicisation.   
While especially some of the large Member States have wished to limit EU influence on their 
national energy policies, the internal energy market provisions seem to set the limits to the Member 
States retention of control. The regulatory networks are therefore used, often by the Commission, 
as market openers , due to their role of initiating technical energy market legislation (I5 2010; I1 
2010). As argued by the Polish energy representative (I6 2010: A3): the clue or core, to be honest, 
to open up the market, are technical provisions . The Slovak energy representative (I5 2010: A1) 
agrees with this view, concluding that liberalisation was achieved through regulation and 
harmonisation , which to a large extent has been left in the hands of the regulatory actors. 
One might conventionally think of regulation as the art of government an endeavour by the 
state to control or steer the market (Levi-Faur 2010: 5). However, today regulation actually works 
as a European driver for the agenda of positive integration within energy policy. Thus, despite the 
liberalisation trend, what we see within the European energy policy is more regulation.  In energy 
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policy, regulation has however been even harder to impose than in other policy areas due to the 
monopolistic structure of the domestic markets and the national security concerns linked to energy58 
(Eberlein 2010; I4 2010; I6 2010).  
4.3.2 Regulatory Networks: ENTSOG and ACER s role in the Energy Policy 
Matrix 
There appears to have developed a general acceptance of the fact that regulatory problems impeding 
the functioning of the internal energy market are increasingly a European predicament and thus 
requires European solutions.  
Many of the regulatory functions within energy policy seem to have been delegated from the 
national setting to a European level of governance in two ways: upwards towards the European 
Commission; and downwards towards NRAs59 and TSOs engaged in EU-wide cooperation 
through the European regulatory networks, ENTSOG and ACER.   
The specific nature of regulatory governance within European energy policy, and the many actors 
involved, to some extent blurs the distinction between who the regulators and regulatees are a 
characteristic of regulatory governance (Levi-Faur 2010: 11). The introduction of the new 
regulatory actors, as the ENTSOG representative (I1 2010: A6) states, increases the complexity of 
the governance . Moreover, some of the actors involved in the regulatory governance process 
concurrently engage in a self-regulating process. While the term self-regulation is not embracing 
the full picture of regulatory governance within European energy policy, it does give an indication 
of the complex picture of the governance process. Thus, the TSOs are constituted differently in the 
individual Member States and some Member States hold more than one TSO. While the single 
Danish TSO, Energinet.dk, is an independent public company, Germany for instance holds 5 TSOs 
as members of ENTSOG members which are private gas transport enterprises owned by large gas 
companies, such as E.ON, Gasunie and WinGas60. This public-private nature of the TSOs is 
interesting in relation to the regulatory governance process, as the TSOs, despite some being private 
companies with profit-driven motives, through ENTSOG take part in the discussions on regulatory 
                                                
58 This opposition did not least surface in relation to the question of unbundling, which was discussed in section 4.2. 
59 The national regulatory authorities (NRAs) are appointed by the Member States and are in charge of the national 
regulation of the energy market. The NRAs shall be independent from the gas producing industry, and are responsible 
for ensuring non-discrimination, effective competition and the functioning of the Internal Market (Council of the 
European Union 2003).  
60 Germany, United Kingdom, Austria, Sweden, Italy and France have more than one TSO as a member of ENTSOG, 
whereas the rest of the Member States only have one TSO as member. 
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matters that will eventually be imposed on themselves61. However, ACER62 and the Commission 
are important gatekeepers in this internal regulatory governance process, since these actors together 
with ENTSOG form part of the regulatory triumvirate  of decision-making (I2 2010: A6; I1 2010; 
Council of the European Union 2009c). Thus, ENTSOG can only act independently to the extent 
that ACER and the Commission approve their proposals for regulatory solutions. The result is that 
the TSOs always feel a pressure to come up with credible solutions in order not to be imposed 
detailed regulation by the NRAs63. As argued by the Danish TSO representative (I2 2010: A6): It 
is a lot less scary for us if we [the TSOs] get to fill out the framework, ( ) because they [the 
NRAs] don t know the system and then ask us concerning all kinds of stuff, then it all breaks down. 
So the TSOs will of course, as long as they can agree on something, aim at keeping the initiative . 
This argument underlines the complexity of the regulatory process, since even the interplay 
between ENTSOG and ACER is conflictual by nature, although it seems to provide impetus to the 
EU regulatory governance.    
ENTSOG is on the Commission s request responsible for elaborating network codes covering areas 
such as network security and reliability rules, network connection rules and third-party access-
rules technical areas which are vital for the internal energy market (Council of the European 
Union 2009c).  
Since 2003, the national regulatory authorities were represented in a European group through 
ERGEG64, but are since 2011 constituted in ACER65, a new EU agency for the cooperation of 
Energy regulators for both gas and electricity. While ERGEG formerly only had an advising and 
coordinating role in relation to the Commission, ACER has the power to adopt individual regulatory 
decisions (Commission 2003; Council of the European Union 2009b).  
                                                
61 As the ENTSOG representative (I1 2010: A8) argues, We have slightly different interests and roles within the 
national systems, and that very much influences on the way the individual TSOs, as well as the regulators, then act 
within this [liberalisation] process . 
62 We delimitate the scope of the analysis from looking at the complex relationship and competence dividing between 
ACER as a trans-European agency and the NRAs. Therefore we use ACER as a unitary actor comprising the policies of 
the NRAs.  
63 According to the procedure laid down in Council of the European Union 2009c, ENTSOG has the right of 
initiative to submit a network code which is in line with the relevant framework guideline to ACER. However, if 
ACER does not consider the proposal from ENTSOG satisfactory, it has the right, on the request by the Commission, to 
overrule the proposal (Council of the European Union 2009c: Art. 6 (10)). 
64 ERGEG is the abbreviation for the European Regulator s Group for Gas and Electricity and was established by 
Commission Decision: 796/2003 (European Commission 2003). 
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 Agency for the Cooperation of European Energy Regulators since March 2011. 
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It could be seen as a major innovation that ACER contrary to ERGEG - can take autonomous 
decisions in case of sustained disagreement between Member State regulatory authorities over 
issues in relation to cross-border exchanges of gas66 (Hancher & de Hautecloque 2010: 6). While 
the ACER Board of Regulators consists of representatives from NRAs and thereby has an 
attachment to the Member States, the formal independence of the Board is clearly stated by ACER67 
and accordingly intended to provide a greater political and legal independence for the members 
( ) from their national governments (Hancher & de Hautecloque 2010: 3). 
Moreover, in a theoretical perspective, one could argue that the shift from ERGEG to ACER is a 
step towards a more distinct European regulatory space , as termed by Levi Faur (2010: 15). More 
specifically, since ACER is given the mandate to take regulatory decisions on its own , it therefore 
blurs the limits between national and European competences. A reference can here be made to the 
theoretical discussion in 3.2.1 on regulatory governance, where it was argued that a blurring 
potentially takes place between the national and the European level (Levi-Faur 2010). ACER is an 
example of this blurring, notably through its different role and task in relation to different 
stakeholders at both the national and the European level. It can be argued that the blurring of 
competences between the different levels entails an increasing focus on solving technical issues to 
advance liberalisation, whereas the security concerns, which to a large extent relate to a state-
centric perspective, perhaps have a more downplayed role. Consequently, the regulatory networks 
within European energy policy seem to promote the liberalisation trend at the expense of 
securitisation. This might also be the reason for the opposition from a number of Member States to 
confer too many regulatory muscles to the regulatory networks (Hancher & de Hautecloque 
2010).     
4.3.3 The Day-to-Day Work: Carrying Out a European Agenda? 
ENTSOG and ACER are envisaged to be strongly involved in carrying out the functional work with 
ensuring security of supply and diversification. Thus, the regulatory networks should ensure the 
interconnection of gas pipelines in Europe and thus create the basis for a more competitive market.  
This is for instance seen with the TEN-E programme for infrastructure interconnection, where 
                                                
66 For a more comprehensive insight into ACER s voting procedures and areas of responsibility, see Hancher & de 
Hautecloque (2010). 
67 As ACER states the Board of Regulators shall act independently and shall not seek or take instructions from any 
government of a Member State, from the Commission, or from another public or private entity (ACER Homepage). 
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ENTSOG provides expert advice on where to invest in new infrastructure (e.g. to enhance reverse 
flow capacity) in order to ensure diversification (ENTSOG 2009). In this sense, regulatory 
governance promoted by ENTSOG plays a concrete role in the overall effort to enhance 
diversification, not least by tabling national projects within the wider framework of European 
energy policy. Thus, whereas diversification efforts are an area of Member State competence, as 
discussed in section 4.2, the regulatory actors also play an important role here, albeit on a more 
technical level. Moreover, while the responsibility for diversification was previously in the hands of 
large state-owned gas producers, thereby concurrently being regarded as a matter of state 
competence the regulatory networks in between levels now play an active role in legitimising 
and securing enhanced European cooperation on diversification (Council of the European Union 
2009b).   
Furthermore, the 2010 Security of Supply Regulation requires both ENTSOG and ACER to be 
closely involved in cooperation at the European level to define and implement the measures for the 
security of supply N-1 formula, which should create the basis for Member State coordination in the 
case of a future gas crisis68 (Council of the European Union 2010). Taken the above into 
consideration, it can be argued that ENTSOG and ACER play important roles in putting high-
level European energy policy into practice. Moreover, the expertise represented in these networks 
makes their decisions highly important for the overall coherence of the European energy policy. 
Hence, the institutionalisation of the national experts could be seen as a horizontal route to foster 
regulatory alignment within and between the Member States (Hancher & de Hautecloque 2010). 
Due to the technically complex nature of energy, the regulatory networks are key actors in deciding 
upon the more narrow definitions and implementation of policies. While these actors act on the 
basis of their technical expertise, the content of their work can in some cases ultimately have a 
political impact. Seen in the perspective of the two trends, it can be argued that the regulatory 
networks by their role of ensuring liberalisation to some extent relegate the security concerns of the 
Member States. Thus, through the regulatory networks important parts of European energy policy is 
brought down to a technocratic level, which complicates high-level Member State intervention 
based on security concerns. 
                                                
68 Article 3 (1): Security of gas supply is a shared responsibility of natural gas    undertakings, Member    States, 
notably    through    their Competent    Authorities, and   the    Commission, within   their respective   areas   of   
activities   and   competence   (Council of the European Union 2010).  
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The structure of the regulatory networks within European energy policy goes beyond the level of 
formal coordination to actually foster regulatory convergence (Hancher & de Hautecloque 2010). 
Thus, contrary to other types of networked cooperation at the EU-level aiming at coordination, in 
particular such as the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), the regulatory networks within 
European energy policy have the aim of harmonising national rules. Moreover, compared to the 
OMC, the ENTSOG representative (I1 2010: A8) describes energy cooperation within and between 
the regulatory networks as certainly more sophisticated [and] focused , and designed to bring 
more efficiency into the process [of liberalisation] through increased trans-European regulatory 
convergence.   
That European regulatory governance within energy policy is increasing is interesting when taking 
into consideration the fact that energy, as argued in section 4.1, is regarded as a highly securitised 
policy area. This, according to neoliberal institutionalism, should prompt difficulties of interstate 
cooperation as securitisation entails a state focus on the retention of formal control. Whether 
Member States, in practice, actually retain full control in relation to the regulatory networks can 
however be disputed. Three main reasons for this development should be highlighted: Firstly, the 
technical complexity of e.g. gas infrastructure interconnection and harmonisation of tariff structures 
entails that the regulatory networks have considerable manoeuvre room from steering from the 
political level of the Member States. Secondly, as will be elaborated on in the following section, 
national energy experts within the regulatory networks are task-oriented , often in pursuance of 
completing the internal energy market, while they are perhaps less sensitive to national political 
considerations. Thirdly, due to the legal setup of ENTSOG and ACER, and their day-to-day 
interaction with the Commission, these regulatory networks are an integrated part of the overall 
Brussels policy game, e.g. as advisors for the Commission on regulatory matters.  
The reasons above however entail a need for further clarification of how these new networks shift 
the competence-structure of the European energy policy, as the liberalisation trend is increasingly 
providing these actors with an important role.  
4.3.4 Cooperation Beyond Delegation: A Shift in Competences? 
With the development towards more European governance networks composed by national 
regulatory experts, the traditional bureaucrats in the national ministries consequently appear to be 
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less involved in the regulatory governance of energy policy. Eberlein & Newman, who study the 
specific role of the national regulatory authorities within European energy policy, argue that these 
actors differ significantly from existing bureaucratic interactions between member state officials
in two ways: They enjoy a high degree of formal delegation and bring direct formal authority, 
without political recourse to legislatures (Eberlein & Newman 2008: 32). This is mainly due to 
these actors role as experts and their high degree of technical knowledge (Eberlein & Newman 
2008). A further point is that the technical complexity of energy regulation in practice limits the 
agency of normal bureaucrats due to their lack of necessary technical expertise (Héritier & 
Lehmkuhl 2008). As a result, regulatory actors participating in ENTSOG and ACER are involved 
due to their technical - rather than political - skills and their actions are legitimised by their 
professionalism (rather than connection to a democratic system) (Eberlein & Newman 2008; 
Hancher & de Hautecloque 2010). Moreover, according to the Danish TSO representative (I2 
2010), actors involved in the regulatory networks seem to focus more on their role as energy experts 
than their role as national representatives. The Danish TSO representative argues that the regulatory 
actors are less tied to a domestic political agenda and to some extent less exposed than normal 
bureaucrats to political scrutiny by the national level (I2 2010; Hancher & de Hautecloque 2010). 
This is recognised by a Polish high-level energy representative (I6 2010: A3), who argues: So to 
be honest, ACER is ( ) because it is situated at the commercial and technical level, out of the 
hands of the governments and the civil servants like me . The Danish TSO representative 
furthermore argues that the TSOs have a tendency to adhere to the European agenda, if they want to 
gain influence in working groups. As he (I2 2010: A8) states: ( )If you go down there [to 
Brussels] with the idea that it is hugely important to preserve the Danish zone model , as an 
example, then you have misunderstood your task. You can neither preserve the Danish zone model 
nor export it to the other countries. That is not what the task is about. So yes, very quickly, the more 
you sit down there you will start to work on the basis of the common European policy and be less 
prone to look at the Danish one . So while the regulatory actors are institutionalised at the 
supranational level as a regulatory space, they tend to distance themselves from the national agenda, 
and instead strengthen common European solutions. Overall, it seems that the regulatory actors - 
through European regulatory networks - are likely to promote a European stance based on 
liberalisation, wherein cooperation and harmonisation is the name of the game .   
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It can be argued that by moving beyond the mere political cooperation towards cooperation on the 
more functional and technical aspects through regulatory governance, a more intense level of 
cooperation is reached. Moreover, as suggested by the above argument by the TSO representative 
and Hancher & de Hautecloque (2010), the supranational cooperation through regulatory networks 
reached with the Third Liberalisation Package ultimately has consequences for the overall Member 
State cooperation within energy policy. If not through the regulatory actors promotion of a 
European agenda, then at least due to a complication of the allocation of responsibility between 
the Member States, the regulatory networks and the Commission (Hancher & de Hautecloque 2010: 
3).  
Levi-Faur (2010:19) argues that regulatory governance implies that the regulatory functions of 
government are being separated from policymaking functions . However, in European energy 
policy it can be argued that at the practical level - due to the blurring of responsibility concerning 
regulatory functions and policy-making functions - the hard-core regulatory aspects and the more 
political aspects of the governance process actually become intertwined. In other words, 
bureaucratic interaction aiming at regulating and interconnecting the European energy markets can 
have implications for the highest level of political debate between states. This will be further 
discussed in the case of Nord Stream in section 4.4.   
4.3.5 Regulatory Networks, the Commission and the Shadow of Supranational 
Hierarchy 
Formalising regulatory coordination through European networks of lower level technical experts 
seems to be a passable solution for Member States, since Member States are still formally in charge 
of the unbundling and liberalisation process. On the other hand, adding this level of horizontal 
delegation to the European governance framework actually implies a strengthening of the role of 
the Commission in carrying the function as watchdog of the liberalisation process (I1 2010).  
Additionally, although a network such as ENTSOG presumably has been assigned clear formal 
tasks, the construction of ENTSOG at the level of horizontal delegation means that its role in the 
institutional framework is not clear-cut: On the one hand, ENTSOG has been designated the role of 
assisting the Commission, e.g. with the elaboration of network codes, but on the other hand, it 
should represent its members, the TSOs. The TSOs are yet again tied to the national interests, since 
they are designated by the Member States. Thus, ENTSOG cannot be said to have the status of a 
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single/unitary actor , but has to mediate between actors at different levels that in some cases have 
very different interests. Therefore, while it is argued by a German energy representative (I3 2010: 
A7), preponderantly targeting ACER, that the regulatory actors have a clear task and clear 
guidelines for what they have to do and what not , then their role in practice, due to their above-
mentioned expertise and position in the governance system, leaves room for interpretation in their 
day-to-day work. As an example, the Commission informally procured policy advice from 
ENTSOG in relation to the EU discussions on the 2010 Security of Supply Regulation. As argued 
by the ENTSOG representative (I1 2010: A11): In case of this, it s still a question of what the 
exact role for ENTSOG is and So what exactly we will do is not clear, but we should give some 
advice to the Commission .  
Consequently, the above makes institutional leeway for the Commission to cast a shadow of 
supranational hierarchy over ENTSOG and thereby in a sense also over the Member States, as the 
Commission is able to act as the principal of the regulatory governance networks. According to 
the representative from ENTSOG, the Commission has a tendency to be milking two cows at the 
same time - a behaviour characterised as opportunistic by the ENTSOG representative69 (I1 
2010: A17). Thus, the fact that a network like ENTSOG is placed in between levels in the 
governance matrix makes room for the Commission to take on a steering role in the regulatory 
governance process. The Commission has a range of opportunities seeking to shape the 
development of the European energy policy including the right of initiative, monitoring, starting 
infringement procedures against Member States and can draw on the expertise of ENTSOG. The 
Commission furthermore uses ENTSOG as a mediator between the European and national levels 
(I1 2010: A17).  
All together, this leaves the Commission in a strong position vis-à-vis the Member States. The 
introduction of the regulatory networks within energy policy is particularly interesting in the 
perspective of the pro-liberalisation approach of the Commission already accounted for, since these 
regulatory networks are intensively working with the Commission on a day-to-day basis. 
                                                
69 There have been examples of the Commission calling upon the ENTSOG secretariat to address its members with the 
view to policy inputs, while at the same time inviting assorted energy companies for roundtables to discuss the very 
same issues. This was the case in relation to the discussions of the Commission s European Infrastructure Package (I1 
2010: A17). 
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4.4 Testing grounds for the EU energy policy  the case of Nord Stream  
In this section, we analyse the case of Nord Stream in order to assess how Nord Stream and its EU 
recognition is an expression of the observed development of the European energy policy. This 
development most notably includes the two-tiered structure of the EU energy policy comprising 
intergovernmental and institutional practices. We therefore proceed with a discussion - guided by 
the neoliberal institutionalist framework - of the intergovernmental debate around the construction 
of Nord Stream. This is followed by an analysis of the institutional process leading to Nord 
Stream s EU recognition inspired by a combination of the regulatory governance framework and 
neoliberal institutionalism. Finally, we discuss how Nord Stream places itself within the European 
energy policy and what ramifications it might have for the wider development of the energy policy 
of the EU. 
4.4.1 The Debate on Nord Stream  Just Business as Usual? 
This is a business venture, it is not public service - that is the argument of Sebastian Sass (2010: 
A22), Head of Nord Stream EU representation, when confronted with the criticism of Nord Stream. 
Even though Nord Stream is only a pipeline project, the initial high-level debate on its 
construction reveals certain defining characteristics of energy policy. In line with the conclusions of 
the previous chapters and the contemplation of Keohane (1984), it seems that pipeline projects with 
the magnitude of Nord Stream can rarely be framed as purely business without political recourse to 
more strategic security considerations.  
Nord Stream, a joint venture between Russian Gazprom and a number of Western European 
companies, was thus heavily criticised by especially Poland and the Baltic States for creating new 
dividing lines in Europe. Even Sweden raised criticism against Nord Stream, but officially based 
the criticism on environmental criteria (Whist 2009). Most of the criticism however remained 
more on the political side reflecting the tense (energy) political relations with Russia (I3 2010: 
A10; EurActiv 2009; Whist 2009; I6 2010; I5 2010; I7 2010). The then Polish Minister of Defence, 
Radoslaw Sikorski, even compared Nord Stream with its bypassing of Poland to the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact; hence the pipeline is constructed offshore through the Baltic Sea instead of 
onshore through Poland (Whist 2009). Despite the efforts of Nord Stream to underline the 
commercial dimension of the pipeline, a Danish energy representative (I10 2010: A21) lucidly 
states in relation to the commerciality of Nord Stream that It is clear that energy is ( ) a political 
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weapon . Less of a surprise is it perhaps that the Polish energy representative (I6 2010: A4) states 
that Russia really uses this fuel [gas] at the same time just to create some larger policy of the 
country . The PR-strategy 
of Nord Stream to seek to 
depoliticise the project 
therefore collides head-on 
with some Member States 
perception of Russia s 
engagement in the project. 
But while much of the 
criticism was targeted at 
Russia, the debate on Nord 
Stream concurrently divulged what seemed to be an ingrained mistrust between the old and new 
Member States. Poland was for instance, in continuation of their pleas for an onshore solution, 
very upset that 7 European countries, including Germany, didn t care about this [the proposal for 
an onshore solution]. They treated us, to be honest, as a non-EU country, as we are speaking so 
much about solidarity and common policy (I6 2010: A4). This shows the ostensible magnitude of 
the pipeline project. Nord Stream therefore also provides a case for understanding the dynamics of 
the European energy policy, as the pipeline perhaps reveals an inclination towards bilateral deals 
instead of relying on a common EU approach towards third country suppliers (Liuhto 2009; Whist 
2009). This concurrently reflects, in line with the argument of Keohane (1984), that 
institutionalisation does not automatically incur cooperation, but rests upon changes of Member 
State calculations of their self-interest. This is a change, which the emerging field of EU energy 
policy perhaps still have to develop.  
Despite the high-pitched debate that followed in the maelstrom of Nord Stream, the Member States 
in favour of the project held that the pipeline would bring about a stronger security of supply for all 
of Europe by introducing a more stable route for Russian supplies (Whist 2009; I3 2010). So while 
the opponents of Nord Stream, mainly the Baltic States and Poland, to some degree seemed guided 
by a classical zero-sum game thinking, the Nord Stream stakeholders sought to establish that there 
would be positive externalities for the bypassed countries as well. As a German representative (I3 
Source: Nord Stream Homepage f 
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2010) states with reference to the fact that the capacity of Nord Stream (55 Bcm pr. year) is higher 
than the demand of the German market:  It s a European project for the European market (A14) 
as it will make markets more liquid (A12). A problem in this regard is however that the Member 
State opponents of the project are energy islands with poor pipeline connection to the European 
market. Regardless of the statement that Nord Stream is not public service, the arguments that the 
pipeline will contribute to all of Europe seem hollow at present due to these technical problems.   
It is however a fact that Nord Stream, despite much criticism of its partakers lack of solidarity with 
the bypassed Member States, is recognised as a project of European interest under the Trans-
European Network for Energy-Programme (TEN-E). Although the criticism increasingly targeted 
the repercussions of the project for the wider European energy policy, this stamp of approval 
provided the proponents with resistibility to many of the arguments against Nord Stream. As 
Sebastian Sass (2010: A10), Head of EU representation for Nord Stream, argues: Politically, it 
confirms that we are a genuine European project. We are not in conflict with the European energy 
strategy. In fact, quite the contrary. If there is a European energy policy, we are at the forefront of 
it (own accentuation). The question raised by Sass as to whether there actually exists a European 
energy policy touches upon a central issue of Nord Stream. Thus, despite increasing 
institutionalisation of principles such as diversification and security of supply, much of the debate 
on Nord Stream essentially took part in a political vacuum with great insecurity as to the direction 
of the energy policy. A concrete example is the criticism raised by Polish centre-right MEP, Lena 
Kolarska-Bobinska, who argued that the agreement was not in line with the type of European 
solidarity envisaged by the Lisbon Treaty , though the TEN-E recognition was granted prior to the 
enactment of Lisbon Treaty, which introduced the solidarity clause (Kolarska-Bobinska 2010; I7 
2010). 
The TEN-E recognition nevertheless gave political legitimacy to withstand the unremitting criticism 
of Nord Stream and provided official backing from the EU publicly. The European Commissioner 
for Energy, Günther Oettinger (cf. Nord Stream 2010), thus expressed his approval of the project, 
when he declared that Nord Stream is a EU priority energy project and important in 
complementing the European energy grid 70. Nord Stream s TEN-E recognition however seemed 
to come as a surprise - even at the highest level. Thus, in 2009 former Polish President Jerzy Buzek 
                                                
70 Larsson (2007) specifically points out that the Commission only see Nord Stream as one route among others.  
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and current Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite both gave expression to their surprise that 
Nord stream was recognised as a priority project (EurActiv 2009). This is a curiosity, since the 
debate on Nord Stream has revolved largely around its mismatch with the European energy policy 
development. What essentially links Nord Stream institutionally to the EU is thus its TEN-E 
recognition. A recognition, which however has received little attention - both politically and 
academically. Despite the criticism of Nord Stream for lacking solidarity, and the surprise that it 
has been given a label of European interest, Sass (2010: A26) argues when faced with the argument 
that the TEN-E recognition of Nord Stream should be damaging to EU energy-solidarity: 
solidarity I find is that everybody commit to those goals that everybody has subscribed to, which is 
a Trans-European Energy Network. You do not decide on projects being on the highest priority 
state status [project of European interest]. You know what I mean? So at least you can not go back 
and say no no we did not mean it . The timing of the recognition however seems vital, as the 
project probably would not have been granted a TEN-E status were the decision to be made today. 
Not least considering the high-pitched controversy over Nord Stream s recognition (Beckman & 
Nicola 2008). It is moreover interesting considering Nord Stream s intensive branding of the EU 
recognition and the pipeline being one of the biggest projects to have been granted a TEN-E status 
that the Commission s current programme manager had not been in contact with the Nord Stream 
consortium (I8 2010). This is in contrast to the argument of Sass (2010: A12), who states that we 
have had very close interaction with the Commission at all levels (own accentuation).   
Taking the above debate into consideration, we investigate in the following whether the TEN-E 
recognition is a result of Member State inattention or simply that the stakeholders in Nord Stream, 
at the time of the decision-making, had the power to push their wishes through. We thus place the 
debate on the recognition process within the wider discussion on intergovernmental versus 
institutional practices within the EU energy policy.  
Similar to processes of regulatory governance (Levi-Faur 2010), the TEN-E decision-making 
process, as discussed in section 4.2.3, seems somewhat separated from the political process. Hence, 
mainly bureaucrats are involved in the process of selecting projects for TEN-E status. As analysed 
in section 4.2.3, the strategy was originally to keep the TEN-E programme bureaucratic in order to 
ensure a technical and distributive approach to the EU diversification efforts. It has nonetheless 
proved to be a vital part of Nord Stream s strategy to meet the criticism by arguing that the pipeline 
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has been supported politically by the Member States through TEN-E. Taking into the equation that 
the TEN-E programme, as analysed in section 4.2, has received relatively little public attention, we 
therefore in the following scrutinise the process leading to Nord Stream s TEN-E recognition. 
4.4.2 The TEN-E Recognition of Nord Stream 
Nord Stream was already in 2000 recognised as part of the TEN-E programme71 (Nord Stream 
Homepage e). The project was included again after a 2006 revision of the programme with the 
label: a project of European interest  the highest of three priority labels (Council of the European 
Union 2006: Annex I). In substance, however, the priority labelling does not grant projects special 
status, e.g. it does not give projects a head start in relation to national authorisation procedures 
(Whist 2009; Larsson 2007; I9 2010). Sebastian Sass contrariwise states that the TEN-E is a 
legally binding instrument , which obliges Member States to swift procedures (SS 2010: A10). 
The TEN-E recognition however first and foremost provided a political pressure on the national 
authorisation procedures, as Nord Stream was able to use the argument that this is a project that 
has received confirmation from all of the countries. It is important and it has an even higher public 
interest than normal projects have (SS 2010: A11). Interestingly, a TEN-E Programme Manager 
(I8 2010: A13) explicitly counter this argument by stating that there is not a political statement in 
the decision to give EU recognition. A Danish energy expert72, who conducted a study on the 
impact of the TEN-E support in relation to national authorisation procedures, furthermore concludes 
that the recognition does not have any real effect (I9 2010). Despite the discrepant statements of the 
legal and political importance of the recognition, the TEN-E status of Nord Stream becomes 
important, due to the fact that the national authorisation, which was necessary to build the pipeline, 
also had to be granted by some of the more critical Member States - e.g. Sweden (SS 2010; Larsson 
2007).   
                                                
71 The formal process of the TEN-E Programme is that the Commission calls for proposals from the Member States to 
nominate pipeline projects for TEN-E recognition (I8 2010). The Commission then assesses and ranks the incoming 
applications and sends them in comitology, where a committee of Member State representatives vote on which projects 
to finally include on the TEN-E list. Lastly, the European Parliament is presented with the list of projects and has the 
scrutiny right before the final decision is made (I10 2010; I8 2010).  
72 The Danish energy expert furthermore works for the same company - Rambøll A/S  who provided consultancy work 
for Nord Stream in relation to the national authorisation procedures and environmental impact assessment reports 
(Rambøll Homepage).  
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It is furthermore a curiosity that Nord Stream was nominated a project of European interest , even 
though the Nord Stream pipeline is placed in international waters, where Internal Market legislation 
does not apply (Oettinger 2010; I9 2010). This is interesting, because the TEN-E guidelines 
prescribe that energy infrastructure should be subject to market principles , and be in line with 
the completion of the internal market in energy (Council of the European Union 2006: (4)). In 
relation hereto, the EU cannot lay claims on Nord Stream to live up to EU rules and priorities, 
which Sass (2010: A14) underlines stating that When it comes to the credibility of internal market 
legislation, third gas directive and so on ( ) we are outside the EU . The recognition of Nord 
Stream as a TEN-E project therefore becomes almost paradoxical taking the pipeline s exemption 
from Internal Market legislation into consideration, and essentially shows the weakness of the 
current EU governance in relation to diversification. Thus, as already analysed in chapter 4.2, one 
method to ensure diversification has been the demand for third-party access, which means that other 
gas undertakings than those owning the pipeline should have a legally enforceable right to gain access 
and use the pipeline to supply customers (Council of the European Union 2003). Due to Nord 
Stream s placement in international waters, the third-party access, as a legal demand, does not 
apply. While other pipeline projects likewise can obtain derogation from this demand, it is 
especially interesting in this case, since much debate about Nord Stream touches upon the role of 
Gazprom. Thus, while there is a clear liberalisation trend within the internal energy market, the 
largest external supplier, Gazprom, operates as a state monopoly under strict government control 
(Larsson 2007; SS 2010). The development of the Russian and European gas markets in many ways 
seem to be the diametrically opposed. Nord Stream however, according to some observers, seems to 
fit in with the strategy of Gazprom, which is to expand its market power into the EU, while 
retaining monopoly at the Russian market (Kupchinski 2009; I6 2010; I7 2010; Larsson 2006).  
Thus, the strategy of Gazprom appears contradictory to the liberalisation efforts, and in a long-term 
perspective poses a challenge to the confidence in the internal energy market, not least from the 
perspective of the most critical states towards Russia, as analysed in section 4.1. A proposed 
solution to this problem has been an onshore pipeline (Larsson 2007). However, Sass unwaveringly 
points to the fact that the TEN-E status does not oblige Nord Stream to submit to alternative route 
suggestions from the Commission or other Member States. As he (SS 2010: A12) puts it there is 
simply no rule, no authority for them over the project, whether you like it or not. It is a simple fact . 
Interestingly, one of the arguments from Nord Stream AG to rebut suggestions for an onshore 
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solution is however at the same time that the project has obtained its vital TEN-E status as an 
offshore solution. Therefore, any changes to the projected route would require a new TEN-E 
application (SS 2010). However, what is important to ascertain in this connection is that the 
recognition does not imply that Nord Stream has to live up to regulatory demands, e.g. third-party 
access, imposed by the Commission. In light of this, it therefore seems exaggerated that Nord 
Stream underlines the pipelines TEN-E status as an offshore pipeline, despite the fact that the 
TEN-E programme in itself would not be able to impose regulatory measures on Nord Stream no 
matter whether it would have been planned offshore or onshore. However, would the route have 
been onshore, it would be subject to the whole package of EU energy legislation, though Nord 
Stream probably could obtain derogation from some parts of it (SS 2010). The TEN-E Programme 
in itself lacks a regulatory tool to sanction intergovernmental pipeline projects, if the projects do not 
live up to the institutionalised liberalisation objectives of the Programme. Overall, this suggests that 
Nord Stream s promotion of its TEN-E status seems disproportionate relative to the actual 
importance of the recognition and the level of regulatory activity through the Programme.   
Notwithstanding the alleged political impact of Nord Stream s TEN-E recognition, interviewees 
suggest that the process leading to the recognition of Nord Stream followed the normal bureaucratic 
procedure for selecting projects. In practice, it is a decision-making process where there is an 
informal rule about not objecting to projects nominated by other Member States, as the Member 
States are more interested in including their own projects than excluding other Member States 
projects (I10 2010; I7 2010). As more pipeline projects/connections ultimately are in line with the 
ethos of liberalisation, it seems almost natural - as neoliberal institutionalism (Deudney & Ikenberry 
1999) contemplates - that Member States guided by this liberalisation trend are preoccupied with 
absolute rather than relative gains. Meanwhile, the apparent separation of political and technical 
matters in the process also reveals another pivotal characteristic of the emerging EU energy policy: 
While the high-level debate among the Member States seems strongly influenced by the 
securitisation trend, much of the day-to-day policy development seems more shaped by a 
functional, bureaucratic liberalisation approach. This functional approach, which incurs more 
cooperative practices than if security concerns remained preponderant, might be helpful in 
advancing the goal of diversification embedded in the TEN-E programme. However, the functional 
approach also induces a weakness in the TEN-E programme as, what happened historically in the 
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TEN-E process was that more and more projects were included [on the TEN-E list] and no projects 
disappeared, so the list grew longer and longer. Today you can find an endlessly long list (I9 
2010: A23). It can thus be argued that the programme loses its exclusivity , even though it 
provides EU-support for pipeline projects to interconnect the European gas market. A problem of 
the TEN-E programme is the limited budget for financial support, which Nord Stream however did 
not apply for, due to the magnitude of the project and the relative smallness of the TEN-E funds 
(Appendix 2: Email from EuropeDirect; Larsson 2007; SS 2010). This however also implies, 
according to a TEN-E Programme Manager (I8 2010: A20), that there is no communication 
[between Nord Stream and the TEN-E office]. They are in the guidelines, fine, but since they didn t 
apply for money we do not contact them . In line with this, it can be argued that the TEN-E 
Programme was perhaps not meant to cope with a project of such political magnitude as Nord 
Stream. 
It is clear that the process behind Nord Stream s recognition was bureaucratic in nature, as projects, 
according to the interviewees, were included by a rather administrative routine separated from the 
political process, since mainly lower-level Member State representatives (bureaucrats) were 
involved in the process of selecting projects for TEN-E status. The regulatory governance 
framework also contemplates that a process of separation of regulatory functions from 
policymaking functions might take place (Levi-Faur 2010). In the case of Nord Stream, it seems 
clear that the EU-recognition had some unforeseen consequences; hence the TEN-E programme had 
intentionally been demarcated as a functional diversification-programme, but the strong debate on 
Nord Stream turned out to have political implications. The bureaucrats involved at the decision-
making level perhaps did perhaps not take these implications into calculation during the recognition 
process. Furthermore, most Member State representatives may not have regarded the TEN-E 
recognition of Nord Stream as a big political issue at the time of decision-making (I10 2010). The 
Lithuanian energy representative (I7 2010) in this regard bemoans the politicisation of the TEN-E 
programme, which she argues was simply meant to be a programme based on a horizontal decision-
making process to support infrastructure projects.   
It is furthermore relevant to take the timing of Nord Stream s EU recognition into consideration. 
The decision-making process leading to the 2006-labelling as a project of European interest 
already took place before the 2004 EU Enlargement. The Lithuanian energy representative (I7 
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2010) argues that the new Member States therefore did not have the possibility to legally object to 
the TEN-E nomination of Nord Stream. The representative (I7 2010: A13) furthermore states that 
the Member States were under influence from Nord Stream to accept the TEN-E recognition of 
Nord Stream: I can assure you that all instruments that were available at that time until now, they 
were used [by the opposing Member States]. But Nord Stream made it good, they just buy support . 
This suggests a not particularly honourable approach by Nord Stream an approach that however 
seems to be in line with the aforementioned increased focus on bilateral deals vis-à-vis common EU 
agreements. Nord Stream for instance, according to the Lithuanian energy representative (I7 2010), 
specifically gave preferential treatment to some Member State companies in order to gather political 
support for the project. Whether this constitutes a different strategy than most other big commercial 
ventures is however questionable. Yet, it highlights the current perception shared by many 
opponents to the pipeline; Nord Stream AG - ipso facto Gazprom to most opponents - has by 
negotiating with individual Member States exploited the weakness of the EU energy policy. Nord 
Stream AG has done so by tempting the Member States to circumvent what should be a solidary 
and politically accountable European approach. This bilateralisation can be seen as a sneaking 
return to traditional state practices, which to some Member States remains incoherent with the 
efforts to consolidate an EU energy policy (I6 2010; I7 2010).  
As analysed in section 4.1 and 4.2, it might however be a bit naive to expect other Member States to 
refrain from these manoeuvres to ensure their own security of supply. So, despite the resistance 
from some Member States, it seems unlikely that the TEN-E recognition could have been 
prevented. But as a Slovak representative (I5 2010: A31) pragmatically states regarding the TEN-E 
recognition process: formally, you didn t follow the procedure that we followed before, so. Then 
we come to the political reasons: If they had enough influence to do that [push the TEN-E 
recognition through], so it s valid . Thus, even from the viewpoint of a critic, the Slovak energy 
representative implicitly acknowledges the name of the game the strongest Member States decide 
the outcome. As we shall see in the following section, the TEN-E recognition of Nord Stream might 
be more coherent with the general development of the European energy policy than the debate gives 
reason to believe. This does however not entail that Nord Stream might not also have political 
consequences for the emerging field of EU energy policy. 
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4.4.3 Nord Stream  In Line with a Paradoxical Development of the EU Energy 
Policy  
As analysed in the above sections, the Nord Stream project has a complexity that brings it beyond 
purely constituting a commercial pipeline project. Many arguments have been presented for and 
against the pipeline, but one convincing argument from the stakeholders towards the public remains 
that Nord Stream has obtained a status as a project of European interest . But as the analysed 
recognition process reveals, the TEN-E status is arguably not as vital in substance as Nord Stream 
AG gives the impression of. Thus, the EU s ability to exercise regulatory governance on Nord 
Stream, through the TEN-E Programme, remains limited and seems to have a minor impact on the 
pipeline. Furthermore, the recognition is the outcome of a bureaucratic process, where the criteria to 
decide on projects were predefined, and the process took place according to a rather slavish 
administrative procedure.   
Thus, despite the intense debate on Nord Stream and its TEN-E recognition, even the strongest 
opposition to Nord Stream would probably have proven largely unsuccessful, as Nord Stream was 
a bilateral project and ( ) they were going to build it anyways (I5 2010: A31). The most powerful 
states often have latitude to determine the development of the institutional framework of 
cooperation (Keohane 1984). Taking into consideration that Nord Stream is intended to supply the 
Western European market and hence the largest Member States, it would have been a surprise if the 
criticism had had any real effect on the pipeline plans. What is more interesting is however the 
Nord Stream camp s continuous effort to frame the pipeline as a European project , when the 
institutional framework, in the language of Keohane, does not seem to have been much of an 
intervening variable (Keohane 1984: 64). The fact that Nord Stream applied for TEN-E recognition 
is actually almost a curiosity to the Slovak representative (I5 2010: A27) because they didn t need 
it. For me it s more PR, I would say. To make it European interest, it sounds different . The idea of 
the EU as an intervening variable thus seems to be part of the strategy of the Nord Stream 
stakeholder Member States to bring the debate down from a high-level discussion to a discussion of 
more technical matters, such as adherence of the project to the agreed (and weak) policy on TEN-E.   
The TEN-E Programme and its recognition of Nord Stream therefore appears to be more in line 
with the current development of the EU energy policy than what the contentious debate perhaps 
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shows. Although principles of security of supply, diversification and solidarity have been 
institutionalised, much of the high-level debate on Nord Stream still revolves around Member 
States traditional security concerns. While the liberalisation trend namely has impacted upon the 
internal dimension of EU energy policy due to the proclivity towards liberalising the European 
energy markets and thus creating a more coherent EU energy policy, the securitisation trend has 
been more pronounced in the external dimension of the energy policy. A prominent example to 
illustrate this is that the strongest critique of Nord Stream concerns the external dimension of its 
construction. Thus, one could perceive an enhanced dependency on Russia as an unsolicited 
externality of the instigation of national security of supply considerations behind Nord Stream. 
This is paradoxical since the gas crisis of 2009 caused an enhanced EU focus on diversification of 
source countries, and in this regard also a focus away from the strong dependence on Russia 
(Vahtra 2009). The most vulnerable Central and Eastern European states have ipso facto also been 
the most critical towards Nord Stream. Whist (2009) argues that the current level of Russian 
investment in new gas fields and infrastructure will likely fail to meet the demand from the EU. As 
Whist (2009: 195) further propagates, Considering the German gas market s size and importance 
for Russia one can imagine that it will be given priority over the smaller gas markets in Eastern 
Europe in case of a shortfall of Russian supply. Thus, a potential consequence could be a more 
divided EU energy map with a few large Western states with stronger security of supply, while 
leaving Eastern Europe more vulnerable.  
To a large extent, Nord Stream seems to place itself in between the liberalisation and the 
securitisation trends. Nord Stream has been able to successfully do so, due to the lack of clear 
European definitions of and agreement on security of supply, diversification and solidarity.  The 
Nord Stream proponents are in this sense right to argue that the pipeline provides security of supply, 
since Nord Stream essentially provides gas (volume) to the European market. Nord Stream is also 
diversifying, in the sense that Nord Stream is simply a new pipeline73, in addition to the already 
existing pipelines that enter Europe. Moreover, Nord Stream also exemplifies the broadness of the 
concept of solidarity besides the institutional solidarity as seen in the 2010 Regulation on Security 
of Supply. Calls have also been voiced for standing together at the intergovernmental level in 
                                                
73
 Whether Nord Stream is also a new source of gas can be disputed. Sass argues that Nord Stream is intended to extract 
gas from the Shtokman-field. This is however, according to other observers, a long-term project (10-15 years), since the 
Shtokman field is not yet developed (Whist 2008; Riley 2008; Liuhto 2009). 
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solidarity externally against Russia. Sass (2010: A26) however disputes this understanding of 
solidarity arguing: I don t subscribe to the concept of solidarity meaning having to keep them 
[Russia] out . Thus, while Sass sees solidarity as something that includes Russia, it has however 
been an argument from some of the critical Member States that European solidarity is to have a 
common stance towards Russia (Larsson 2007; Umbach 2009).  
It could thus be suggested that Nord Stream is just supplying the European market with gas, which 
would otherwise not have entered the EU, instead of constituting a Russian divide and rule 
strategy. Thus, a vital argument in favour of Nord Stream is that the positive externalities of getting 
additional volumes on the market should be in focus, rather than fears based on remnants from a 
Cold War situation. Taking into consideration the Russian state-control of Gazprom, President 
Vladimir Putin (cf. Larsson 2007: 50) almost paradoxically targeted this Russophobia, when 
arguing that to politicize economic relations is counter-productive and harmful .  
It is clear that the Nord Stream stakeholders have likewise taken advantage of the debate to 
legitimise the pipeline. In this sense, they have argued that Nord Stream is in line with the 
liberalisation trend by pointing to Nord Stream s capacity and diversification of route as the 
functional answer to the security of supply concerns. Meanwhile, the harsh rhetoric of the debate 
with clear references to the securitisation trend has been fended off as inadmissible with the 
argument that Nord Stream is business and should be treated as such. As Sass (2010: A23) argues 
[The] only thing there is, is a shareholder agreement between the companies. This is the most 
genuine entrepreneurial approach you could have .  
Despite Nord Stream becoming one of Europe s biggest pipelines, the EU seems to have had little 
latitude to influence the project. While Nord Stream has obtained, and heavily promoted, its TEN-E 
priority status, it has been shown that the TEN-E in substance provides few institutional remedies to 
ensure compliance with the wider framework of the EU energy policy. TEN-E was perhaps 
originally just meant to be a minor distributive diversification-programme based on a liberalisation 
trend. The apparent lack of connection between the TEN-E, as a distributive programme, and the 
general political development of EU energy policy however seems to have been a fallible approach. 
Consequently, the EU seems to have been placed on the sideline, while Nord Stream has sought 
legitimisation through a nebulous TEN-E programme, which has not kept up with the wider energy 
policy development.  
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The potential ramifications of Nord Stream with regards to a common European energy policy 
appear serious. The case of Nord Stream has exposed a clear division between the old and new 
Member States at the intergovernmental level. This division has been sought balanced by 
instigating an internal market for energy with clear-cut market driven rationales and a regulating 
role for new actors such as ENTSOG and ACER. The placement of Nord Stream in international 
waters however positions the project in sort of a free market vacuum and thus outside this 
regulatory competence -area. Despite this vacuum, the cries for solidarity and a common European 
stance towards Russia however seem a bit misplaced.  
The preceding analysis exactly shows the contentiousness of an unresolved EU energy policy based 
on liberalisation, when Member States have to take account for the security implications of energy.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusions 
The structure of this thesis has been guided by the quest to answer the research question: How is the 
European energy policy developing and to what extent can the EU recognition of Nord Stream be 
understood in the context of this emerging policy area? The relevance of investigating the 
European energy policy development is apparent, as the EU level of energy policy is rapidly 
developing with a change of roles and competences. Much of the debate on energy policy however 
still revolves around a conventional theorem of state-centricity due to energy traditionally being a 
matter of state competence, which is why the importance of institutions is often relegated. We 
quickly concluded that such an approach would not be able to capture how energy policy is 
developing in the EU. The approach to the EU energy policy was therefore intentionally 
multifaceted with a theoretical framework that provided the opportunity to capture the development 
of an apparent three-stage development rocket of the EU energy policy: 1) the emergence of 
intergovernmental cooperation, 2) the process of institutionalisation of policies and 3) the 
regulatory governance process. We specifically aimed at understanding how the development of the 
EU energy policy, captured by these three stages, was influenced by two trends of securitisation and 
liberalisation.  
The analysis of the emergence of intergovernmental cooperation and the discussions on the 
direction of the EU energy policy show that the energy policy is in continuous change. We can 
furthermore conclude that although the two trends from the outset seem partially contradictory, it is 
essentially the interplay between them that provides impetus for a movement towards stronger 
energy cooperation between the Member States. Even though discussions are hard between the 
Member States regarding the need for a more integrated EU energy policy with more competences 
to the supranational level, the cooperative road taken by the Commission has proved to be a 
skillful approach to overcome the problems of energy becoming securitised. Thus, while this 
securitisation theoretically could have been expected to constitute an outright hindrance to 
institutionalised cooperation, we can conclude that it is actually giving momentum to further 
cooperation  at least on the internal dimension of EU energy policy.  
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Our finding is however that the internal dimension is preponderantly influenced by a liberalisation 
agenda and strongly steered by the Commission; a liberalisation agenda which has provided the 
possibility to partly overcome Member State reluctance towards stronger institutionalised 
cooperation.  
We furthermore find that the occurrence of gas supply cuts from external suppliers has expanded 
the discussion on the EU energy policy to also include the contentious area of external energy 
policy, which incur strong security sentiments in the Member States. The response from the EU-
system however seems to follow the trajectory of the European energy policy with the 
institutionalisation of a mix of policies and principles with the preponderant aim of establishing a 
full-fledged liberalised internal energy market. This lack of clear institutionalisation of an external 
dimension however entails incertitude among the energy stakeholders as to the extent of pre-
eminence of EU policies.  
Despite uncertainty as to the competences of a European energy policy, we see a progressive 
institutionalisation of the principles of security of supply, diversification and solidarity. Whereas 
these principles and their functional expression traditionally were seen as a state competence, a 
European-level of competence has been inserted. Security of supply, strongly informed by national 
security concerns, has essentially been intertwined in the liberalisation agenda for the internal 
energy market. The institutionalisation of the principle in a concrete regulation has thus provided 
legitimisation to the efforts to ensure a liberalised market. The diversification principle - clearly 
shaped by the liberalisation trend - has been found to be the long-term response to the securitised 
debate on security of supply. We conclude that an EU-institutionalisation of diversification has 
taken place and has recently been added a more political dimension. However, the external 
dimension of diversification is still faced with clashing Member State interests, which has prompted 
calls for European solidarity. The principle of solidarity seems strongly influenced by the fact that 
the starting point for the principle has been where agreement could be reached: the internal 
dimension. The principle of solidarity has however increasingly been highlighted as essential 
towards third country suppliers taking the principle beyond the internal energy market. This is 
however also where the principle has hit the ground, as no consensus has been reached among 
Member States as to what solidarity should imply in concrete policies.  
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We conclude that a new level of regulatory governance has been introduced at the supranational 
level, which complicates and challenges the conventional picture of European energy policy as an 
area solely governed by the highest political level of the Member States.  
The introduction of new regulatory actors through European regulatory networks can be seen as a 
functional response to the capability gap of the energy policy emerging in the maelstrom of the 
liberalisation trend. We find that these regulatory actors are key drivers for the established 
European energy policy agenda of completing the internal energy market through specific 
regulation. The regulatory actors (TSOs and NRAs) play an important role in relation to the overall 
European energy policy, since their position in between levels allows them to act as liberalisation 
drivers in the day-to-day management of the internal energy market. They concurrently bridge the 
gap and to some extent blur the border between Member State competences and EU-competences. 
Whereas these actors are engaged in technically complex regulatory matters, they have been shown 
to have considerable political impact for the wider European energy policy. Thus, the analysis of 
the institutional setup and practical governance process shows that the regulatory actors have a 
tendency to adhere to the pro-European liberalisation agenda, while relegating the Member States 
national agenda, often based on security concerns. Thereby, despite the low public attention hereof, 
we find that the regulatory power of ENTSOG and ACER grants these networks almost 
exclusionary characteristics, as Member State bureaucrats are not necessarily able to take part in the 
technicalities of regulation on e.g. tariff codes and gas infrastructure.  Overall, we can conclude that 
through the regulatory governance process there is a tendency towards a strengthening of an EU 
energy policy based on the liberalisation trend.   
The case of the EU s recognition of Nord Stream proved to be a pertinent litmus test for the overall 
development of the EU energy policy. The debate on Nord Stream  despite the strong liberalisation 
trend - showed that energy and pipelines cannot be framed purely as business. The discussions on 
Nord Stream highlighted the limits to the strong EU emphasis on liberalisation of the markets, 
while assigning less importance to reaching agreement on the external dimension of a common 
energy policy. The case of Nord Stream thus shows that the EU-institutionalisation of energy policy 
has not overcome the East-West Member State divide, which is especially lucid in relation to third 
country suppliers. 
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We conclude that Nord Stream exposes the institutional and regulatory weakness of the external 
dimension of European energy policy this is not least the case with the EU s TEN-E recognition 
of Nord Stream. While Nord Stream has heavily used its status as a European project politically, we 
have shown that the TEN-E programme at the time of Nord Stream s recognition was mainly a 
bureaucratic, distributive programme without grandiose political visions.   
We thus find that the recognition of Nord Stream is the result of a combination of 1) lack of 
political attention, 2) the fact that the strongest states benefited of and therefore decided on the 
project and 3) its placement in a regulatory vacuum of the EU energy policy. This last point refers 
to the fact that Nord Stream, due to its location in international waters, is exempted from Internal 
Market legislation in spite of being acknowledged through a framework that should promote the 
internal energy market. This is a finding, which actually did not surface in the fierce debate on the 
pipeline.  
The criticism of the Nord Stream pipeline appears to target the wrong man . Opponents of Nord 
Stream should target their criticism at the EU energy policy instead of Nord Stream. While Nord 
Stream in many ways is a contentious pipeline, it is exaggerated to say that Nord Stream does not 
live up to the principles of European energy policy. Nord Stream essentially plays by the rules of 
the game . What our multifaceted approach to the EU energy policy and Nord Stream reveals is that 
by targeting only one dimension, such as the critique of Member State involvement in Nord Stream, 
one risks reaching a fallacious conclusion. The case of Nord Stream should lead to self-examination 
in both the pro-Nord Stream camp and the opponent Member States. Nord Stream is unquestionably 
a symptom of the undecided development of the external dimension of the European energy policy.   
Theoretically, our combination of two different types of theory, neoliberal institutionalism and 
regulatory governance has allowed us to target what we have found to be three different stages of 
European energy policy development: The intergovernmental cooperation, the institutionalisation of 
EU energy policy, and the regulatory governance process. Thereby, we have found that the 
development of European energy policy comprises an increasingly complex set of actors, albeit 
intergovernmental Member State relations still play an important role due to the lack of clear-cut 
competence-transfer to the EU. We therefore find that the conventional, often one-dimensional, 
approach to energy as a matter of state competence skirts the fact that energy policy is increasingly 
complexified .      
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Thus, Nord Stream s exemption from the real regulatory framework essentially exposes the 
weaknesses of the overall European energy policy. By this thesis, we have shown that while a rapid 
development of EU energy policy is taking place internally in the EU, a common external policy 
should obtain highest priority on the European agenda the coming years.     
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Appendix 1: Interview Persons 
In this appendix, we elaborate further on the interviewees and their relevance in connection with 
our research area. As already deliberated on in Section 2.2, the interviewees range from high-level 
energy representatives of Member States to lower-level representatives engaged in the process of 
regulatory governance, and experts involved in the construction of Nord Stream and EU-recognition 
process.  
Concerning Member State experts, we have chosen to interview actors from states that are involved 
in, or have voiced criticism of, the Nord Stream project. Furthermore, the selection process has 
sought to reflect the views of representatives from both Western and Central-Eastern Europe in 
relation to the general development of the EU energy policy.   
We have conducted interviews with high-level energy representatives from four Member States74: 
Lithuania (I7 2010), Slovakia (I5 2010), Poland (I6 2010) and Germany (I3 2010). Although we 
recognise that this does not provide an exhaustive sampling of countries, we do however see 
perspectives in the fact that these states represent a divide both in terms of geographical location, 
economic resources and market power.  
Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia were chosen since both states rely heavily on gas supply from 
external suppliers. The interview with the representative from Lithuania is also used to reflect on 
the overall position of the Baltic States in relation to energy policy. The Baltic States have been 
characterised as an energy island in several European Commission policy papers on energy75, 
thus illustrating these states lack of integration into the European gas grid, and moreover their 
vulnerability in the case of future gas crises.  
Lithuania s energy dependency on Russia makes Nord Stream a pivotal case, as it is not part of the 
Nord Stream and has officially been criticising its construction (Geopolitika Homepage). Poland 
                                                
74 Interviews conducted with Member State officials will, often upon interviewee request, not be perceived as the 
official view of the Member State, but rather as reflecting the personal perception of the interviewee in relation to the 
topic. 
75 E.g. European Commission 2006; European Commission 2009b: The Baltic Sea Region States reach agreement on 
the Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan
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has from the highest level of the government heavily criticised the decision to construct the Nord 
Stream pipeline through the Baltic Sea, and thus not use Poland as a transit country (Hundley 
2010). Germany, on the other hand, is involved in Nord Stream, since the German gas producers 
BASF and E-ON are the largest shareholders in the project next to Russia s Gazprom.   
Furthermore, a representative (I2 2010) from the Danish transmission system operator (TSO) for 
gas, Energinet.dk has been interviewed76. The TSOs work at the European level through 
ENTSOG s working groups to promote the completion and functioning of the Internal Market and 
cross-border trade for gas in the EU (ENTSOG Homepage). In addition, most TSOs are involved 
in cooperation at the European level through their membership of the European Network of 
Transmission System Operators for gas (ENTSOG).  
We also conducted an interview with a representative (I1 2010) from the ENTSOG secretariat in 
Brussels. ENTSOG is the institutional umbrella representing the TSOs at the European level. These 
interviews are relevant, since ENTSOG and its members are involved in the regulatory governance 
process at the EU level and they can therefore elaborate on how this process functions in practice. 
Furthermore, these actors reflect the level of horizontal delegation in between the Member States 
and the Commission. Following our theoretical approach, these interviews allows for an analysis of 
the interplay in this triangle. Information regarding the functioning of the governance process and 
the interaction between the different actors is best obtained through interviews. The reason is 
primarily that the novelty of these regulatory networks implies that the roles of these actors are in 
practice not clearly defined (I1 2010: A11).  
One could argue that it would have been appropriate to include interviews with representatives from 
TSOs in other Member States. However, this delimitation reflects our purpose, which is to 
understand the governance process itself and not to analyse potential conflicts of interest between 
different TSOs. We do however need to underline that the Danish TSO representative specifically 
mentioned his pro-European stance in relation to his work at the European level. This is a 
noteworthy consideration, as other TSOs might have had a more national strategic inclination to the 
work in ENTSOG. We therefore seek to take into account that the Danish TSO representative puts 
                                                
76 Energinet.dk is an independent public enterprise established and owned by the Danish state as represented by the 
Ministry of Climate and Energy (Energinet.dk Homepage). 
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forward his own viewpoints rather than suggesting that he was necessarily representing the stance 
of other European TSOs.   
To gain knowledge of the process behind the Nord Stream project, we have conducted interviews 
with a number of stakeholders, both in relation to the construction of the Nord Stream and its EU 
recognition. Interviews have been conducted with a representative (I9 2010) from Rambøll 
Denmark, the consultancy group that has been involved in the Nord Stream project since the initial 
plans to build a pipeline started in 199777, and most notably conducted environmental impact 
assessments and authorisation management for Nord Stream. While primarily being involved in the 
technical aspects of the project, the interviewee was also asked to reflect on the political aspects of 
Nord Stream.   
To obtain information on the recognition of Nord Stream as a European project, an interview has 
been conducted with a Commission Programme Manager of the TEN-E (I8 2010). Whereas our 
working questions relating to the internal market aspects of European energy policy could have 
been relevant for the interview, only questions relating to the Trans-European Networks for Energy 
Programme (TEN-E) were dealt with at the interview due to a wish from the interviewee.   
An interview was also conducted with Sebastian Sass (SS 2010), the Head of EU Representation of 
Nord Stream AG - the consortium responsible for constructing the Nord Stream gas pipeline. We 
specifically asked Sass to reflect on the criticism of Nord Stream and its coherence with the 
development of the European energy policy. While this interview was run as the other interviews, it 
should be noted that Sass, as a spokesperson, in addition underlined that he fully represents the 
official view of Nord Stream.   
We furthermore conducted an interview with a representative from the Danish Energy Agency (I10 
2010), who gave perspectives on the Danish stance towards the European energy policy and the 
work in the gas coordination group at the EU-level. The Danish Energy Agency is an agency under 
the Danish Ministry of Climate and Energy.  
                                                
77
 Under the name North European Gas Pipeline . 
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While not fitting into the above categorisation, we also interviewed a high-level representative (I4 
2010) of Denmark s largest gas producer, DONG Energy. As head of a working group on a CEPS78 
report with inputs to the future development of EU energy policy, the interviewee was relevant both 
as an expert and as a gas producer/supplier representative.   
                                                
78
 Centre for European Policy Studies, a Brussels-based think-tank (www.ceps.eu).  
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Appendix 2: Mail from Europe Direct regarding Nord Stream 
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 2010 16:32:51 +0200 [10/20/10 16:32:51 CEST] 
From: Europe Direct <citizen_reply@edcc.ec.europa.eu> 
To: ukolsen@ruc.dk 
Reply-To: "citizen_reply@edcc.ec.europa.eu" <citizen_reply@edcc.ec.europa.eu> 
Subject: [Case_ID: 0311850 / 9343528] TEN-E funding for Nord Stream (Energy Policy) 
Dear Mr Olsen, 
We acknowledge receipt of your message which has been transmitted to the relevant services of the European Commission for their 
input and took therefore longer to be answered. We apologize for any inconvenience this may have caused to you. In response to 
your question regarding the Trans-European Energy Networks (TEN-E) programme, we would like to inform you that the 
Commission has not allocated financial support for investment in Nord Stream, which is financed solely by its private shareholders 
and by loans. It is for the shareholders alone to decide whether the project is too expensive and hence a financial risk for them. 
We kindly invite you to consult a text of a parliamentary question that may be of interest to you, we recommend you use the 
advanced search facility available on the European Parliament?s website, at the following URL: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/application/search.do
Once you are on the above webpage, you should insert the number of the question (i.e. "0169") as well as the year (i.e. "2008"), 
before clicking on the link to search. Then, in order to access the text of the question, please click on the document icon that appears 
on the result page. Please note that the page containing the text of the question also contains a similar icon on which you should click 
if you wish to read the answers provided to previous related questions. 
You can also search by words, should you be interested in searching on your own key words or on another topic in the future. 
However, as you pointed out correctly The North European Gas pipeline, known as the ?Nord Stream? project, is included in the 
decision No 1364/2006/EC of Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006 laying down guidelines for trans-European energy 
networks. The project is labelled as a Project of European Interest ? the highest possible priority, which would make it eligible for 
EU funding. However, the Nord Stream consortium made of commercial companies has not requested such financial support from 
the Commission. 
Another parliamentary question on the subject you might find interesting can be found at the following link: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2008-5285&language=ET
Projects financed through the Trans-European Energy Networks (TEN-E) programme in 1995-2009 can be found on the website of 
the European Commission`s Directorate General (DG) for Energy (no reference to this project) at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/infrastructure/tent_e/financial_aid_en.htm
Finally, for further information we kindly invite you to contact DG Energy at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/contact/index_en.htm
We sincerely hope that the information provided will be helpful to you. 
With kind regards, 
EUROPE DIRECT Contact Centre 
www.europa.eu - your shortcut to the EU! 
Disclaimer 
Please note: We will try to ensure that you receive the information requested, or to direct you to an appropriate source. However, we 
are unable to comment on specific issues pertaining to EU policy, and information provided by EUROPE DIRECT may not be 
considered as legally binding. 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Date: Sunday, 19/09/2010 14:20:44 
From: "Ulrik Olsen" <ukolsen@ruc.dk> 
Subject: [Case_ID: 311850 / 9343528] TEN-E funding for Nord Stream (Energy Policy) 
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-------------------------------------------------- 
Nord Stream is a gas pipeline, which is recognised as a project of 'European interest' under the Trans-European Networks for Energy 
(TEN-E) structure.  
The pipeline was approved as a TEN-E project in 2000 (under the name 'North European Gas Pipeline') and confirmed again under 
the TEN-E structure revision in 2006. 
- How much funding has Nord Stream received from the EU, as a TEN-E project? 
- When has Nord Stream received funding? 
- What is the primary source(s) of the TEN-E funding for North Stream? (Structural Funds, Cohesion Fund, EIB?)  
Best regards,  
Ulrik  
